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1.1   Introduction 
 
Economic growth is inextricably linked to energy. Energy is required for almost all 
economic activities. Petroleum, comprising of crude oil and refined petroleum products, is 
one of the prime sources of energy in the world. To a large degree, petroleum fuelled the 
rapid post-war economic growth achieved in the OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) countries. A few decades earlier, petroleum began to erode 
coal’s dominance as an energy source; by mid-century (1950s) it had taken over as the 
preferred fuel in these countries. By the 1970s, petroleum was powering transportation, 
supplying one-third of industrial sector power and roughly one-quarter of electricity 
generation in the OECD countries.1 Petroleum has been playing an increasingly significant 
role behind the growth story of the non-OECD countries as well. Oil consumption in the 
developing and emerging non-OECD countries especially India and China now dominates 
global oil demand growth.  
However, the central problem that nations worldwide have consistently been facing is that 
this crucial non-renewable energy resource is scarce and is concentrated in a few 
countries/regions of the world. The surplus production capacity of petroleum is largely 
concentrated in the Middle East and West Asia. This imbalance in distribution has serious 
implications on the growth as well as energy security of the countries that are not self-
sufficient in terms of indigenous production of petroleum and are largely dependent on 
imports from the aforesaid regions to fuel their economies. The oil crisis of 1973-74 bears 
ample testimony to the severity of the problem underlying this imbalance in supply of oil.  
Coming to India, although the petroleum industry of the country is one of the oldest,2 India 
is one of the least-explored countries in the world. In 2005-06, the balance recoverable 
reserve of crude oil in India stood at 786 million tonne and the annual production of crude 
oil was only around 33 million tonnes. The annual demand in that year, however, was more 
than 130 million tonne, thereby calling for huge imports of crude. In fact, given the 
burgeoning growth in oil consumption attributable to the rapid growth of the Indian 
                                                            
1    http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2007/oil_security.pdf, p.15. 
2   In India oil was discovered at Makum near Margherita in Assam in 1867 nine years after Col. Drake's 
discovery in Titusville (Pandian, 2005). 
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economy post-1991, coupled with supply-side constraints, such as insignificant domestic 
supply of crude (attributable to a stagnating domestic production), low reserve accretion and 
inadequate availability of appropriate substitutes, among other factors, made India emerge as 
a major net importer of oil. 
 
India  has persistently been depending on imported crude oil (primarily from the oil and 
petroleum exporting countries in the Middle East) to meet the lion’s share of its requirement. 
The import dependence for crude and the consequent vulnerability of the country to oil price 
shocks has exacerbated over the recent past owing to rapid growth of the Indian economy 
post-1991 that has fuelled a rapid growth in oil consumption.  
Given the paramount importance of petroleum for the Indian economy and its increasing 
import dependence on this front, domestic pricing of crude oil and petroleum products 
assumes enormous significance for the country.  The pricing regime not only influences the 
cost of energy for the economy as a whole but also has significant implications on economic 
growth and welfare. A close look at the pricing regime in the petroleum sector in India 
reveals that for nearly two and half decades (from 1975 to 1997) the petroleum sector in the 
country was operating in a state of complete protection under Administered Pricing 
Mechanism (APM). It is only in 1998 that the sector embarked on a gradual transition to a 
regime of deregulation and open competition.  
 
The pricing of crude and petroleum products in the country has been influenced by a 
multiplicity of politico-economic factors and (oft-contradictory) interests of various actors 
and interest groups involved in the matrix, such as  the consumers, particularly the 
vulnerable sections; the producers; refiners; marketing companies; and the government. Till 
1997-98 the domestic petroleum sector in India was operating under Administered Pricing 
Mechanism (APM) for refined petroleum products. The pricing mechanism was based on the 
concept of retention price, by which refiners were allowed to retain out of their sale proceeds 
- cost of crude, refining cost and a reasonable return on investment.  The same mechanism 
was extended to marketing and distribution companies, which were compensated for 
operating costs along with an assured return. In addition to these, the price at which the 
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finished products were finally sold was set by the Government and was totally delinked from 
returns of oil companies. The APM played a significant role in insulating oil producers, 
refiners and marking companies from global oil price fluctuations and fulfilled the socio-
economic objectives of the government considerably but in the process failed to generate 
adequate incentives for investment in the sector and thus failed miserably to create a vibrant 
and globally competitive oil industry.  With the ushering of liberalization and economic 
reforms in 1991 the policy makers increasingly began to feel that APM might no longer 
work successfully as it had in the past and the energy security of country would be at stake if 
a robust petroleum industry is not created.  The reasons for the overriding concerns and 
serious rethinking by the government were many. Some of these are - 
• Sharp increase in demand for petroleum products and increasingly felt need for 
large investments: The demand for petroleum products particularly in the second half 
of nineties had been increasing at a compound annual growth rate of about 6% but 
investments in the industry failed to keep pace with the demand resulting in large 
imports of crude and even finished products. Furthermore, crude oil production had been 
plateauing without discovery of new exploratory wells.  The value of imports increased 
from less than US$ 4 billion in 1990-91 to about US$ 13 billion in 2000.  Large imports 
simply exacerbated the crisis in macroeconomic management, especially the exchange 
rate and inflation and hence it was essential to bring down the imports to manageable 
levels.  The policymakers felt that this would only be possible if the petroleum sector is 
fully liberalised to attract substantial foreign and domestic investments. 
• Difficulties in periodic adjustment of prices: With the responsibility of fixing the 
prices of petroleum products, the government, driven by political prerogatives, simply 
kept on postponing the decision of hiking the prices that inevitably led to burgeoning oil 
pool deficit.  The only long-term solution to this problem was that the government 
should get out of the responsibility of fixing prices leaving them to market forces. 
• Inefficient use of fuel and sub-optimal inter-fuel substitution: Due to cross-
subsidization, the market prices of key petroleum products like petrol, diesel, domestic 
LPG and Kerosene were not reflective of the underlying economic value of the products 
leading to large scale inefficiency in use of fuel and sub-optimal inter-fuel substitution. 
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• Need to make available inputs to user industries at competitive prices: 
Petroleum products are vital inputs to key industries. With the opening up of the 
economy to international competition, the user industries could become competitive 
only if the inputs are made available at market determined competitive prices and not at 
prices fixed by the government. 
• Difficulty in administration of APM: Administration of APM was becoming 
increasingly difficult with the partial opening up of the sector allowing private sector 
refineries. 
 
Realising the need of the hour, the Union Cabinet approved the dismantling of the APM 
(administered pricing mechanism) for the petroleum sector on 20th November 1997. The 
dismantling was carried out in phases over four years, and was along the lines suggested by 
the Expert Technical Group (ETG), which had been appointed earlier to recommend on the 
process of dismantling. The ETG recommended complete dismantling of the APM in a 
phased manner over 4 to 5 years, beginning from 1 October 1997, and ushering in a market 
determined pricing mechanism.  The dismantling primarily involved withdrawal of cost plus 
formula, abolition of retention prices and movement towards market driven prices, 
decanalisation of imports and exports, rationalization of import duties, reasonable tariff  
protection to encourage investment of a regulatory framework to oversee the functioning of 
and enforcing a competitive framework in the hydrocarbon sector.  In the light of this brief 
backdrop, which churns out the context for further research and analysis, the chapter 
examines the evolution of APM along with its rationale, objectives and functioning and 
analyses the limitations which led to its dismantling. This would be followed by a detailed 
analysis of the pricing of crude and petroleum products in the post-APM scenario along with 
its implication for the upstream and downstream oil sector, the consumers and for the overall 
energy security and sustainability of the economy. 
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1.2  APM: Evolution, Rationale, Functioning and Limitations 
 
1.2.1  Evolution of APM: Brief History 
 
Up to 1939, there were no controls whatsoever on the pricing of petroleum products.  
Between 1939 and 1948, the oil companies themselves used to pool accounts for major 
products without any intervention by the government. However, since independence, the 
pricing of petroleum products in India has persistently witnessed several structural changes 
in policies. In 1948, an attempt was made to regulate prices through Valued Stock Account 
procedure. This was basically a cost plus formula based on import parity to which were 
added all elements of cost such as ocean freight up to Indian ports, insurance, ocean loss, 
remuneration, import duty and other levies and charges. The realization of oil companies 
under this procedure was restricted to the import parity price of finished goods plus excise 
duties/local taxes/ dealer margins and agreed marketing margins of each of the refineries.  
Any realization in excess of the normal was surrendered to the Government.   
Given the huge outgo of foreign exchange on imports, the government from time to time 
appointed a number of committees to examine or re-examine petroleum pricing. The first 
such committee, headed by K.R. Damle, was constituted in the early sixties. The Committee 
examined the issue of foreign exchange conservation, particularly as the refining and product 
imports were in the hands of foreign oil companies and proposed incentives for the oil 
companies to increase gross profits by lowering their operating and other costs. It also 
recommended for reduction of discounts from the Free-On-Board (FOB) prices. Platt’s Oil 
Gram was considered as the reference to fix the FOB prices. Furthermore, in view of the 
multiplicity of products and their usage, lubes and greases were kept out of the pricing 
formula, which had been essentially applied to bulk products. For lubes and greases the 
committee recommended a block control system under which a ceiling was fixed for 
blending charges, packaging and marketing costs and profit margins. Appendix 1 provides 
information on the major refined petroleum products and their usage. 
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As the validity of the ceilings recommended by the Damle committee was only till March 
1965, the government had set up another committee under the chairmanship of T.N. 
Talukdar. The broad terms of reference of the Talukdar Committee were (i) the manner of 
determination of ex-refinery prices of products produced by the refiners, (ii) the manner of 
determination of landed prices in respect of similar products which may be imported, (iii) 
determination of marketing and distribution charges of the products, and (iv) determination 
of ceiling selling prices in respect of lubricants, oils and specialities. 
The Talukdar committee essentially extended the concepts laid down by the Damle 
committee, i.e. prices were to be based on the principle of import parity with fixed formula 
of build-up up to the carriage, insurance and freight (CIF). The price formula was firm and 
had the twin advantages of being reasonable and encouraged the oil companies to enhance 
their profitability by lowering costs. Additionally, it had the potential of a lower cost basis 
for fixing margins in the future. 
The recommendations of the Talukdar committee were retained till December 1965, when 
the government appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Shantilal Shah. The new 
committee was required to determine the landed cost of imported POL (petroleum, oils and 
lubricants), feasibility of making all refineries, including inland refineries, as pricing points, 
marketing and distribution charges, and profit on distribution and marketing operations 
product wise, and determination of dealer commissions for MS (motor spirit or petrol), HSD 
(high speed diesel oil), SKO (superior kerosene oil) and LDO (light diesel oil). The 
recommendations of this committee had been implemented for a period of three years 
starting from June 1970. 
 
The Shantilal Shah committee, however, did not regard import parity to be a sound basis for 
fixing prices and recommended the discontinuance of the import parity principle on the 
following grounds.  
- About 90% of the total demand for petroleum products was met by indigenous 
production and no major shortfall was anticipated.  
- Prices of finished products and crude oil did not necessarily move in tandem.  
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- Import  parity did not take into account inter refinery differences in terms of product 
pattern, type of crude used, location and scale differences.   
- The structure of West Asian product prices, which was the basis of determining 
prices in India, did not necessarily reflect the indigenous cost of production that 
should ideally be the determining factor for pricing of petroleum products.   
 
After the 1973 oil crisis the government constituted the oil price committee (OPC) under the 
chairmanship of S. Krishnaswamy in March 1974. The OPC recommended the 
discontinuation of the ‘import parity’ principle and instead suggested the Administered 
Pricing Mechanism (APM) for pricing of petroleum products. Based on these 
recommendations, the APM came into existence in December 16, 1977.  
 
One of the important drawbacks of the import parity pricing was that the indigenous cost of 
production was totally overlooked while determining producer prices. This issue under the 
new mechanism was addressed through ‘retention pricing’, by which refiners were allowed 
to retain out of the sale proceeds, cost of crude, refining cost and a reasonable return on 
investment.  The same mechanism of retention pricing was also extended to marketing and 
distribution companies. The Government of India was fixing the prices of finished products 
and the returns of oil companies were de-linked from the price at which the goods were 
finally sold.  This process of fixation of prices of finished products by the government 
coupled with the retention mechanism for refiners, marketing and distribution companies 
was referred to as the Administered Pricing Mechanism or APM. The mechanism was 
implemented under the aegis of the Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas through its 
executive wing “Oil Co-ordination Committee” (OCC) with its secretariat at New Delhi. 
 
1.2.2  Objectives of APM 
 
The primary objectives of the APM were as follows: 
• To optimize the utilization of refining and marketing infrastructure by treating the 
facilities of all the oil companies as common industry infrastructure, the access of 
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which would be available to all the oil companies by hospitality arrangements, thus 
eliminating wasteful duplication of investment.  
• To make available all products at uniform ex-refinery prices so as to minimize cross-
haulage of products and associated energy costs. 
• To ensure continuous availability of crude to refiners by recognizing import needs 
wherever there are deficits in indigenous production. 
• To ensure that the returns to oil companies are reasonable and in line with 
operational efficiencies and to see that sufficient resources are generated to enable 
industry to setup facilities to meet the growing needs.  
• To ensure stable prices by insulating domestic market from the volatility of crude and 
product prices by making products available at subsidized rates for weaker sections 
of the society and priority sectors in the industry through cross-subsidization. 
 
1.2.3  Salient Features and Build up of Prices under APM 
The salient features of APM were:- 
• The well head price of the indigenous crude oil was determined as the weighted average 
of cost of production of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and Oil India 
Limited (OIL), which are government-owned companies involved in upstream activities 
i.e. exploration and production, plus 15 per cent post-tax return on capital employed to 
compensate for the operating expenses.  
• Pricing of crude oil at a uniform FOB cost to all the refineries based on the pooled FOB 
price of indigenous and imported crude oil irrespective of whether they processed 
indigenous crude or imported crude. Other costs of bringing the crude oil to the 
refineries were reimbursed at actual. In the case of imported crude, ocean loss of oil at 
0.5 percent on carriage and freight (C&F) cost of crude oil was allowed. In fine, 
refining companies were provided crude oil at a fixed price, which had no relation to 
domestic or world crude oil prices. Import of crude oil and petroleum was fully 
canalized through the government-owned Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) and controlled 
by the Empowered Standing Committee of the Government of India (GoI). 
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• Refining costs and return (refining margins) were also decided on retention basis. Every 
three years, the Government used to determine the standard refining cost and return on 
capital employed for each refinery. The standard refining cost plus return on capital 
employed when divided by the crude throughput gave the retention margin per tonne for 
that refinery. This used to remain constant for that refinery during the three year period. 
However, certain types of annual escalations were allowed over and above the retention 
margin.  
• The retention price that was paid to refineries took into account the delivered cost of 
crude (the weighted average of the indigenous and imported crude price), refining cost 
and 12 percent post-tax return on the capital employed. This was then allocated to each 
product by a set of indices. The index of kerosene used to be considered as 1. The 
indices of other products were developed after taking into account factors like the then 
current and prospective demand and supply, ability of individual products to bear 
additional charges, their end use pattern etc. 
• Product-wise uniform ex-refinery price was the weighted average of retention prices of 
all the refineries taken together for that product plus a uniform addition of Rs.25 per 
selling unit (expressed in kilo litre or metric tonne). This was the price at which the 
refineries used to transfer the product to a marketing unit (also referred to as refinery 
transfer price). The difference between the retention price and the ex-refinery price (or 
refinery transfer price) was surrendered to or claimed from the oil pool account. 
• Marketing costs and return (marketing margins) was also decided on retention basis. For 
the distribution and marketing of refinery products, prices were fixed under a cost-plus 
formula, wherein marketing and distribution costs were fully compensated and a post 
tax return of 12 percent was guaranteed on investment. Marketing margins used to be 
averaged out to compute industry margins for inclusions in the selling price. The oil 
marketing public sector undertakings (PSUs) were permitted to sell petroleum products 
as restricted by a sales plan entitlement (SPE). A company exceeding its SPE had to 
surrender a portion of its marketing margin to a deficit company. Thus, the market 
shares of individual PSUs were controlled. The marketing margin used to be updated 
once in three years. 
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• The ex-storage point price consisted of ex-refinery price, excise duty, marketing 
margins, various surcharges built into the price to cover specific under-recoveries due to 
charging uniform consumer price irrespective of actual costs incurred plus an 
adjustment factor known as product price adjustment. Product-wise uniform ex-storage 
point price at the refinery point were arrived at by averaging the marketing margins. 
The product price adjustment (PPA) was designed to allocate subsidy or cross-subsidy 
and to ensure lower consumer prices for products used by the weaker and vulnerable 
sections of society. The price of a few products such as petrol, as already mentioned, 
was maintained at a higher level to compensate for the losses incurred from subsidizing 
kerosene, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), and diesel. Under the APM regime, an 
increase in price implied a hike in PPA and thus had an impact only on the ex-storage 
point price and not on the ex-refinery price.  Since retention prices used to remain 
unaltered there was no major effect on oil companies. 
• At the distributors’ level, the dealer’s commission was more or less uniform and 
regulated by the government. The retail selling price of a product to the consumer 
includes in addition to industry average costs and profits, notional railway freight, 
retailing cost, various surcharges, and government levies. The refineries were the 
primary pricing points and demarcation of pricing zones were attached to these points. 
Irrespective of the company marketing the products and the locations, from which the 
products were actually supplied, the price of petroleum products at all primary pricing 
points were considered as uniform. 
A flow chart illustrating the buildup of ex-refinery, ex-storage point and consumer retail 
price of petroleum products is given in Appendix 2. 
 
As far as the consumer prices were concerned, socially sensitive domestic consumption 
products like kerosene, LPG and diesel used for agriculture and mass transportation were 
heavily subsidized.  Furnace oil (FO), or naphtha used for fertilizer manufacturing were also 
subsidized. Subsidies were non-transparent as they were financed not by direct budgetary 
support but by cross subsidization. In fact the prices of petrol, ATF (aviation turbine fuel), 
and fuels like furnace oil, diesel oil and naphtha used in the industry other than fertilizer 
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manufacturing were kept much higher than their cost of production to balance the under 
recoveries on subsidized products. 
 
The entire APM was operated through an oil pool account (OPA) maintained by Oil 
Coordination committee (OCC), wherein inflows and outflows of the pool account were to 
be kept in balance to provide uniform and stable prices throughout the country.  Companies 
either used to surrender or withdraw from the OPA.  Weekly settlements were made in the 
oil pool account.  Inflows to the oil pool account were from collection of surcharges on sale 
of petroleum products, while outflows were aimed at meeting shortfalls in various elements 
of standard cost of production.  Though the number of pool accounts was more than fifty, the 
major pool accounts in which the oil companies used to adjust their claims and surrenders 
were: 
 
 Crude oil price equalization account (COPE) 
 Cost and freight (C&F) adjustment account 
 Freight surcharge pool (FSP) account 
 Producer price adjustment (PPA) account 
 
Fig. 1.1 indicates the major OPAs and the stages and cost elements in the price build-up 
process which they correspond to. A deficit would generally arise in OPA under APM if –  
¾ Domestic crude oil production fell so that the country would have to import more 
crude at much higher prices; 
¾ International prices rose, thus increasing both crude and finished products import 
bills; 
¾ The rupee depreciated against the dollar, leading to an increase in the import bill in 
rupee terms; 
¾ Supply from domestic refineries lagged demand, leading to an increase in import of 
finished products; 
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Fig. 4.1: APM Structure and Pool Accounts3 
 
 
 
 
1.2.4.  Limitations of APM 
 
On the positive side APM primarily helped in 
¾ an orderly growth of the oil industry 
¾ continuous availability of products to consumers at fairly stable prices 
¾ insulation of marketing companies, refineries and oil producers from international 
price fluctuations and protection of their market shares. 
¾ achievement of socio-economic objectives of the government to a large extent 
 
                                                            
3 Extracted from the inaugural address by Dr. R. K. Pachauri in the round table discussion on ‘Deregulation of 
Downstream Oil Sector & its Impacts’, organized by Tata Energy Research Institute (TERI), New Delhi on 27th 
March, 1998.  
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However, in spite of the penalties and rewards, which were built into the system, the cost-
plus formula under APM failed miserably to create a globally competitive oil industry and 
had instead created oligopolies by guaranteeing profitability through retention prices.  Some 
of the concerns that were raised against APM and its adverse fallouts are: 
 
• The APM regime could not generate adequate financial resources for investment in 
the upstream and downstream sectors. As investors always prefer free market setup 
with minimum government interference in investment and operating decisions, they 
were usually reluctant to commit large funds in the petroleum sector under the 
regime as any decision of the government could potentially influence the profitability 
and market shares irrespective of the efficiency with which a company operates. 
• As reimbursements exceeded the surrenders by the oil companies to the pool 
accounts due to non-revision of the retail prices of petroleum products (charged to 
consumers) in line with the cost of production, these accounts started showing deficit 
that made PSUs unviable with accumulated outstanding balances.   
• The prices of politically sensitive products did not reflect their true economic cost.  
Subsidies and cross-subsidies led to large distortion in consumer prices and 
encouraged adulteration and diversion. The low price of diesel encouraged a 
significant shift from petrol to diesel driven cars.  Furthermore, a large quantity of 
kerosene got diverted for use in diesel engines and power plants. In general, the 
pricing of subsidized petroleum refined products much below their economic value 
led to inefficient, wasteful use of those products resulting in sub-optimal inter-fuel 
substitution. 
• Political compulsions often dictated prices. The administration of pricing system in 
petroleum sector was thus inflexible to changes in global crude prices. In a country 
where more than 50% of the demand is met through import of crude oil, such 
inflexibility could result in hazardous consequences.  As a consequence, the pool 
deficit, as on March 1996 was more than Rs. 50 billion and as on March 2000 it 
geared up to Rs. 63 billion.  The situation became untenable and could not be 
allowed to continue for long. 
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• Since an assured return was provided on capital employed, there was no guarantee 
that the facilities put up by the oil companies were being used in the most efficient 
and productive manner. Since all investments and costs were reimbursed, there was 
no incentive to make profitable investment decisions. The APM thus provided little 
incentive for cost minimization, technological upgradation and improved 
productivity.  In fact, the refineries used to have an inherent fear that any attempt to 
increase crude throughput could result in an exhibition of improved standards that 
could effectively turn out to be a penalty for being more productive. SPE (Sales Plan 
Entitlement) scheme had stifled market competition and the marketing companies 
were being used as mere distribution channels. Thus APM failed to create a 
consumer-friendly and internationally competitive vibrant petroleum industry. 
• In the upstream sector APM failed to generate sufficient incentives (since price of 
crude oil paid to the producers was lower than international price) to invest in risky 
ventures to develop oil and gas reserves. 
• As long as the players were PSUs, the government would control investments and 
costs, but with the entry of private players in the market, adequate monitoring system 
would be required to examine whether the private refiners had been deriving undue 
benefits out of the cost-plus mechanism and would essentially involve substantial 
additional cost which might eventually be borne by the consumers. Furthermore, the 
entry of large number of private players in the market would make it increasingly 
onerous to administer the APM and ensure a level playing field to public players.  In 
order to secure oil supplies for meeting future demand it therefore became imperative 
to move towards a Market Determined Price Mechanism (MDPM) through price 
deregulation which would allow the refineries to stipulate refinery gate price of 
petroleum products that would compete with prices of imported products. 
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1.3  The Dismantling of the APM 
 
In the light of these concerns that were raised against the APM regime, the government 
finally announced the complete dismantling of the APM on 21st November 19974 which was 
to be carried out in a phased manner over the period 1998-2001, beginning 1st April 1998.  
The highlights of this policy of dismantling are as follows: 
• Cost plus formula withdrawn: The cost-plus formula would be withdrawn for 
indigenous crude producers (ONGC and OIL). The oil products would be given 75 
percent and 77.5 percent of the weighted average FOB price of actual imports for 
1998-99 and 1999-00 respectively.  This would gradually be increased to 100 percent 
by 2002. 
• Retention pricing abolished: The system of retention pricing would be abolished 
for all (existing and new) refineries from 1st April 1998 and the pricing of petroleum 
products at the refinery gate prices of the controlled products viz. petrol, diesel, 
kerosene, ATF, and LPG would continue to be controlled during the transition 
period. Some subsidy on LPG would be retained and borne by the oil companies 
while subsidy on kerosene would be borne by the fiscal budget.  The prices of the 
decontrolled petroleum products namely naphtha, furnace oil, LSHS, LDO(light 
diesel oil), paraffin wax and bitumen, would be market driven and suitably adjusted 
to reflect the prevailing market conditions. 
• Decanalisation5 of imports and exports: Imports and exports of all petroleum 
products, except crude, natural gas liquids (NGL), ATF, petrol and diesel would be 
decanalised during the transition period. However, sourcing and import of crude 
would be allowed to joint and private sector refineries under actual user licensing 
policy. 
 
                                                            
4  Resolution No.P-200112/29/97-PP, 21st November 1997, MOPNG, New Delhi,p.1-6 
5  Decanalisation means removal of quantitative restrictions. 
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1.4  Transition to Market Determined Pricing Mechanism  
 
The Government in November 1994 had set up an industry study group under the 
chairmanship of Mr. U. Sundararajan, the then Chairman and Managing Director, BPCL 
(Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited) to prepare the blueprint of the deregulation and 
tariff reform that was required in the oil sector and provide a framework for the development 
of Market Determined Pricing Mechanism (MDPM). The Committee, while expressing its 
concern for a possible burgeoning increase in consumption of petroleum products in future 
and limited existing indigenous production and refining capacity to meet that expected 
increase, came out with some broad recommendations which are as follows: 
 
• Recovery of oil from existing fields should be enhanced; exploration efforts should 
be accelerated to find new fields and acquire equity capital abroad. 
• Additional refining capacities and marketing infrastructure should be created 
• Port facilities and pipeline capacities should be augmented 
• Foreign and domestic investments should be promoted in the hydrocarbon sector 
• Efficient use of oil should be promoted 
 
To achieve these broad objectives, the Committee suggested that the entire oil sector 
(upstream, downstream and marketing) should be completely opened up through the 
following steps; 
 
• Introduction of market determined pricing mechanism (MDPM) 
• Removing all restrictions on imports and exports 
• Removing restrictions on sourcing and type of crude and product pattern 
• Allowing oil companies to decide on development of infrastructure, mode of 
transportation, the selection of marketing areas, appointment of dealers/distributors, 
the amount of commission payable to intermediaries and the sales volume, purely on 
commercial considerations 
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• Ensuring fair competition by setting up a regulatory body to control the market in a 
transparent manner. Pipelines that are natural monopolies should be treated as 
utilities and the common energy carrier principle should be adopted 
• Setting up of an oil commodity exchange to provide an institutional market for 
exchange of crude and petroleum products at market related prices 
• The hydrocarbon sector should be totally de-regulated at one go  
¾ by evolving suitable tariff structure to promote investment in the sector 
without diluting the revenues of the government  
¾  by removing subsidies; wherever products need to be subsidized, Central and 
State Governments should directly disburse subsidies and oil companies 
should be permitted to sell all products at market related rates 
 
The report of this study group provided essential inputs for the Strategic Planning Group on 
Restructuring of the Indian oil industry (known as ‘R’ Group) headed by Dr. Vijay Kelkar, 
the then Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. The ‘R’ Group submitted its 
report in September, 1996, underscoring on dismantling of APM for the following primary 
reasons: 
 
• Cost-plus compensation did not provide adequate incentive for cost reduction leading 
to inefficiencies 
• Absence of internally competitive petroleum sector  
• The entry of private sector would inflate the costs under cost-plus formula which the 
consumers would have to bear  
• Wide distortion in consumer prices on account of subsidies and cross-subsidies 
• Adverse impact on oil companies due to huge deficits in Oil Pool Accounts as price 
revisions were untimely  
 
Appendix 1.3 contains some sector-wise recommendations by the R-Group. The entire 
sector-specific reforms, as suggested by the ‘R’-Group, was to be carried out in phases. 
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By end-August 1997, as a result of explosive growth of deficit in the Oil Pool Account (on 
account of burgeoning subsidies on a number of products), the oil companies (particularly 
Indian Oil Corporation, which was the canalizing agency for oil imports), were faced with a 
severe liquidity crunch and on September 1, 1997 in a ‘Comprehensive Package to end Oil 
Pool Deficit’6, the Government announced a modest increase in the ex-storage price of high-
speed diesel (HSD) by Rs. 1.80 per litre, of liquid petroleum gas(LPG) by Rs 15 per 
cylinder, and of petrol by Rs 1.00 per litre to resist any further increase in Oil Pool Deficit. 
However, the price of kerosene was not revised. The Government also announced its 
decision to provide petroleum products such as fuel oil, low sulphur heavy stock (LSHS), 
naphtha to industrial users and bitumen at import parity prices. Subsidy on fertilizer inputs 
was decided to be funded directly from the budget. Furthermore, in order to enhance credit 
of oil companies the government also announced its decision to issue oil bonds worth Rs 
18,200 crore to the oil companies on July, 1997 (an estimated amount of deficit on the pool 
account as of June 30, 1997).  
 
While it was announced that this transaction would remain outside the budget (thus leaving 
fiscal deficit unaffected), the Government decided to provide immediate liquidity to the oil 
companies by making Rs. 5000 crore of these oil bonds (worth Rs 18,200 crore) eligible as 
collateral for loans.  
 
In order to shift to Market Determined Pricing Mechanism (MDPM) the Government 
decided to resort to soft landing approach through careful phasing-in in line with the 
recommendation of the Expert Technical Group (which was appointed to examine the 
impact on various sectors at different levels of duty structure in case of dismantling of 
APM)7 and did not de-regulate the prices of crude and petroleum products at one go (as 
suggested by the Sundararajan Committee). The reason for resorting to soft-landing 
approach was attributed to higher adjustment cost that would have arisen due to large 
                                                            
6  Box 7.3, Economic Survey 1997-98. 
7       The Expert Technical Group was appointed by Government of India vide its order No. P-20029/21/95-PP 
dated June 25 1996 with the following primary objectives: a) re-examination of the notion of retention 
mechanism in the oil sector; b) examination of the feasibility of introduction of notional import-parity 
concepts for pricing of crude oil and petroleum products in the country in order to promote 
competitiveness and cost-effectiveness in the petroleum sector ; c) examination of the impact on various 
sectors at different levels of duty structure in case of dismantling of APM; and d) any other allied matters.  
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increases in relative prices of subsidized petroleum products for one-time shift to MDPM. In 
other words, the phase-in period could be visualized as a period of gradual reconciliation of 
apparent short-term conflicts that would have arisen among the interests of three groups of 
economic agents: the consumers or end-users of petroleum products, the oil producers and 
refiners and the government itself.8  
 
The Government of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas vide order No. P-
20012/29/97-PP dated 21 November 19979 decided the details of the phasing of dismantling 
programme of APM and the corresponding duty structure for the terminal year i.e. 2001-02 
after considering the recommendation of the Expert Technical Group (ETG). The details of 
the phased dismantling process are given in Appendix 1.4.  Some of the salient features of 
the phased dismantling, which came into effect from 1.4.1998 are as follows: 
 
• Crude Prices: Cost-plus formula would be withdrawn for indigenous crude oil 
producers and the prices that the oil producers are going to receive would be 
increased to international levels in a phased manner by paying pre-announced 
increasing percentage of weighted average FOB (Free On Board) price of actual 
imports of crude oil during the transition period. 
• Refinery-gate prices10 : The system of retention pricing would be abolished for all 
(existing and new refineries) and the pricing of petroleum products at the refinery 
gate level would move towards import parity with the exception of the refinery gate 
prices of controlled products viz. petrol, diesel, kerosene, LPG and ATF. The prices 
                                                            
8   As far as the consumers are concerned, the dismantling of APM and linking the domestic price 
determination of petroleum products with international market price at one go would immediately lead to a 
substantial increase in prices of subsidized petroleum products like kerosene (primarily used for lighting 
and cooking by rural households). As for the refiners, the gradual phasing-in would also not have adverse 
impact on supply-response because of the lead time needed for setting up necessary infrastructure which is 
essential to increase supply of petroleum products and enhance energy security. Furthermore, an 
immediate shift would also have implications in terms of government revenue which it earns from the 
sector (like customs duty, excise duty and other central and state levies). 
9   MoPNG Resolution NO.P-20012/29/97-PP dated 21 November 1997 (appeared in The Gazette of India, 
Extraordinary, Part-1-Section1, New Delhi, Monday, 24 November 1997). 
10    The refinery gate prices of products are the prices at which the marketing division of an oil company or an 
oil marketing company purchases the product from refining division or a refinery. It is also called the ex-
refinery price or the refinery transfer price.  
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of these controlled products would be fixed at ‘adjusted import parity’ prices for the 
existing refineries during the transition period. All other products would be sold by 
the refineries at market driven prices. 
• Consumer Prices: The consumer prices of major petroleum products would be 
moved to market-driven prices. Price of diesel would be fixed on the principle of 
import parity upto ex-storage point level with immediate effect, and prices of other 
major products, viz. LPG, ATF, kerosene and petrol, would be moved towards 
principle of import parity in a phased manner and prices of paraffin-wax, bitumen, 
naphtha, FO (fuel oil) and LSHS would be decontrolled. 
• Servicing the Oil Bonds: The transition period would be utilized for servicing and 
amortising the oil bonds worth around Rs. 18,200 crores, which would be issued by 
the Government to the oil companies.  
• OCC with enhanced autonomous powers: The price of crude and petroleum 
products during the transition period would be fixed by OCC (Oil Coordination 
Committee) with enhanced autonomous power. 
• Decanalisation of Imports and Exports: The imports and exports of all petroleum 
products, except crude (slop crude and crude condensate), NGL, ATF, petrol and 
diesel would be decanalised during the transition period. However, sourcing and 
import of crude would be allowed to joint and private sector refineries under actual 
user licensing policy.    
• Rationalisation of Duties on Crude and Petroleum Products: The duties on crude       
(customs duties) and petroleum products (customs and excise) would be rationalized 
in a phased manner. 
• Encouraging Investment: The investment in the refinery sector would be 
encouraged by providing reasonable tariff protection and making marketing rights for 
transportation fuels viz. petrol, diesel and ATF conditional on owning and operating 
refineries with an investment of  at least Rs. 2000 crores or oil exploration and 
production companies producing at least 3 million tonnes of crude oil annually. 
• Cost-plus Formula withdrawn: The cost-plus formula for shipping of crude oil 
would be  withdrawn and the rates would move towards market related rates 
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• Freight Subsidy: Freight subsidy on supplies to far flung areas would be met 
through fiscal budget and  
• Establishment of regulatory framework:  Establishment of a regulatory framework 
for overseeing the functioning of and enforcing competitive framework in the 
hydrocarbon sector. 
 
As a follow-up of the aforesaid decision on decontrolling the price of petroleum products, 
the Government decontrolled the pricing of Aviation Turbine Fuel (ATF) with effect from 1 
April 200111 and finally decided to completely dismantle the APM in the hydrocarbon sector 
with effect from 1 April 2002.12  
 
1.5 . Post-APM Scenario 
 
1.5.1  Crude  
 
Pricing13 
 
As mentioned before and as shown in Appendix 1.4 with effect from 1 April 1998 the crude 
oil producers had been paid a pre-announced phased increase in percentage (75% for 1998-
99, 77.5% for 1999-2000, 80% for 2000-01 and 82.5 % for 2001-02) of the international 
FOB prices on a year to year basis.14  
 
In the post-APM period effective from 1 April 2002 the prices of indigenous crude oil are 
being determined on the basis of the Crude Oil Sales Agreement (COSA) between the 
producers and the refineries by benchmarking various indigenous crude oils to equivalent 
international crude oils. 15 
                                                            
11      Gazette Notification Ref. 20018/2/2000-PP dated 30 March 2001. 
12     Gazette Notification Ref. P-20029/22/2001-PP dated 28 March 2002. 
13  This section draws largely on Chapter 1 of GoI (2005). 
14     These payments were subject to a floor of Rs 1,991/MT (metric tonne) and a ceiling of Rs 5,570/MT 
(Rs. 6,470/MT for March, 2002). 
15  For imported crude oil the pricing is based on the actual cost incurred by various refineries while 
importing the same and comprises items like FOB cost, freight to India, ocean loss, customs duty, port 
charges etc. Moreover since there are nearly 100 grades of crude oil produced in the world and all are 
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The import parity price of crude oil produced by ONGC, the largest crude oil producer in 
India, consists of the following components:-  
1. FOB prices of the respective marker crudes16 adjusted for Gross Product Worth17 (in 
US $/ barrel18) 
2. Ocean Freight (Average Freight Rate Assessment for VLCCs19) 
3. Insurance  
4. Customs Duty 
5. Ocean Loss 
6. NCCD 20@ Rs 50/T (applicable from 1 March 2003) 
7. Port dues (Wharfage, Port Charges, Landing Charges, Bank Charges etc.) 
8. Octroi (applicable for Mumbai refineries of HPCL and BPCL only) 
 
The crude oil produced by Oil India Limited (OIL), another crude oil producer, has however 
been bench marked to Nigerian Bonny Light21 due to similarity in quality. OIL receives the 
                                                                                                                                                                        
not necessarily actively traded the methodology of pricing of crude oil is based on “Reference” or 
“Marker” crude oil that is actively traded in a particular region. For instance, for US and North 
America, WTI (Western Texas Intermediate) is used as a marker, for Central, Eastern and Middle 
Eastern countries Brent or Dubai crude are usually used as markers. Brent crude is generally 
considered as a global marker. While pricing any imported crude a premium or discount over the 
‘Marker’ due to quality and locational differences is usually taken into consideration. 
16   For ONGC-Assam the linked marker crude is average of Nigerian Bonny Light and Quo Iboe, for 
ONGC-North Gujarat it is Arab Heavy. For ONGC-South Gujarat, Bombay High and ONGC-South 
the linked marker crude is average of Nigerian Bonny Light and Quo Iboe. Bonny and Quo Iboe are 
the names of two of the ports of Nigeria. See also footnote 19. 
17   Gross Product Worth (GPW) is the weighted average value of the refined products obtained from a 
barrel of crude oil at the refinery gate. It is calculated by multiplying the prevailing spot price for each 
product by its percentage share in the product yield of a typical barrel. GPW is used to indicate the 
difference in quality between indigenous crude and similar international crude. 
18   Unit of volume for crude oil and petroleum products. One barrel equals 42 US gallons or 35 UK 
(imperial) gallons, or approximately 159 litres or 9,702 cubic inches (5.6 cubic feet); 6.29 barrels 
equal one cubic meter and (on average) 7.33 barrels weigh one metric ton (1000 kilograms). One 
barrel of crude equals 5604 cubic-feet of natural gas, 1.45 barrels of liquefied natural gas (LNG), or 
about one barrel of gas oil. 
19   VLCC means Very Large Crude Carrier  
20   NCCD or National Calamity Contingent Duty is a form of excise duty which has been imposed on 
Crude Petroleum Oil as per Section 136 (1) of the Finance Act, 2001 and is calculated on the net 
quantity of Crude Petroleum Oil received in the refinery or gross quantity produced and supplied from 
the oil field to the refinery. 
21  Bonny Light oil is a high grade of Nigerian crude oil with high API gravity (low specific gravity), 
produced in the Niger Delta basin and named after the prolific region around the city of Bonny. The 
very low sulphur content of Bonny Light crude makes it a highly desired grade for its low 
corrosiveness to refinery infrastructure and the lower environmental impact of its by-products in 
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monthly average of the high and low FOB price of Nigerian Bonny Light (as per Platts 
Oilgram22) adjusted for GPW and discounted for Base Sediment and Water (BS&W).23 In 
addition, OIL receives 50 per cent of pipeline transportation charges in respect of crude oil 
sales to all refineries except NRL24 (Numaligarh Refineries Limited) in Assam, if the FOB 
price of crude oil exceeds US $21 per bbl. In case the crude oil price falls below US$21 per 
bbl, OIL receives sales tax in addition to adjusted FOB price plus 50 per cent of pipeline 
transportation charges, as stated above. However, since 1 April 2002, the FOB price has 
consistently remained above US $21 per barrel.25  
 
Taxes and Duties  
 
Cess: Cess is levied on indigenous crude oil by the Central Government and collected under 
Section 15 of the Oil Industry Development Act (OIDA), 1974. The Act came into force 
following successive and steep increases in the international prices of crude oil and 
petroleum products since early 1973, when the need of progressive self-reliance on 
petroleum and petroleum based industry raw materials assumed great significance. 
Accordingly, Oil Industry Development Board (OIDB) was set up in January, 1975 under 
OIDA to provide financial assistance for the development of oil industry. 
The rate of cess for the period March, 2003 to February, 2006 remained at Rs. 1800 per 
tonne on crude oil produced in the country as compared to Rs. 900 per tonne till February, 
2002. However, as a measure under the Union Budget 2006-07, cess on petroleum crude oil 
had been increased from Rs1,800 per tonne to Rs 2,500 per tonne and is currently existing at 
                                                                                                                                                                        
refinery effluent. Other grades of Nigerian crude oil are Qua Ibo crude oil, Brass River crude oil, 
and Forcados crude oil.  
22  Platts, a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies, is a leading global provider of energy and metals 
information.  Platts Oilgram Price Report is a daily report that covers market changes, market 
fundamentals and factors driving prices. Platts Oilgram Price Report also brings a vast array of Platts 
international prices for crude and products, netback tables, and market critical data. For more details 
see: http://www.platts.com. 
23  Base sediment and water (BS&W) basically implies water and other extraneous material present in 
crude oil. 
24  Numaligarh Refinery Limited (NRL) was set up at Numaligarh in the district of Golaghat (Assam) in 
accordance with the provisions made in the historic Assam Accord signed on 15th August 1985 and 
has been conceived as a vehicle for speedy industrial and economic development of the region.  
25  It deserves to be underscored here that the import parity price of crude discussed above is distinct 
from the actual cost of production of crude that includes operating cost, recouped cost (comprising of 
depreciation, depletion and amortization), statutory levies (royalty, cess, NCCD, sales tax, octroi etc.) 
and normative return on capital employed 
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the same level. However under the New Exploration Licensing Policy (NELP)26 cess has 
been abolished in order to encourage Exploration and Production activities in India. All 
investors venturing in Exploration and Production (E&P) activities in India under NELP 
including National Oil Companies both Public and Private and Multinational Companies are 
provided level playing field and no cess is payable on production from areas licensed/leased 
under NELP.  
The proceeds of cess are first credited to the Consolidated Fund of India and a certain sum of 
money as deemed fit by the central government, are made available to the OIDB after 
appropriation by the Parliament. 
Table 1.1 shows the collection of revenue from Oil Development Cess from 2000-01 to 
2007-08. 
 
Table 1.1: Realisation of Oil Development Cess from Crude Oil  
Year Cess (in Rs.crore) 
1990-91 2757 
1999-00 3243 
2000-01 2728 
2001-02 2731 
2002-03 4501 
2003-04 5134 
2004-05 5248 
2005-06 5007 
2006-07 7034 
2007-08 6866 
     Source: Petroleum Statistics at a Glance < available at www.mopng.nic.in> 
 
                                                            
26  The New Exploration Licensing Policy (NELP) was formulated in 1997-98 to provide a level playing 
field to the private investors by giving the same fiscal and contractual terms as applicable to National 
Oil Companies (NOCs) for offered exploration acreages (offshore and onshore). 
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Royalty 
 
Royalty is levied by State Governments on crude extracted from their respective 
jurisdictions. Royalty in respect of mineral oil is payable under the provisions of Section 
6(A) of the Oilfields (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 and the Petroleum and 
Natural Gas Rules, 1959. According to these provisions, rate of royalty shall not exceed 20% 
of the sale price at the oil fields or oil well-head. Furthermore, the rate of royalty shall not be 
enhanced more than once during any period of three years. Appendix 1.5 shows the revisions 
in the rate of royalty since 1990. From Appendix 1.5 it could be observed that over the larger 
part of the nineties royalties used to be collected at specific rates However since April, 1998 
the royalty got revised to ad-valorem rate of 20 percent of the well head price. Table 1.2 
below shows the collection of Royalty from crude oil by the Indian Government. 
 
Table 1.2: Contribution of Royalty from Crude Oil to the Consolidated Fund of the 
Government 
Year Royalty (in Rs.billion) 
2000-01 22.72 
2002-03 30.67 
2003-04 31.74 
2004-05 42.71 
2005-06 50.67 
2006-07 58.57 
      Source: Petroleum Statistics at a Glance < available at mopng.nic.in> 
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Customs Duty 
 
Customs Duty is a central duty, consisting of basic customs duty and additional customs 
duty, also known as countervailing duty or CVD, which is equivalent to the excise duty on 
the same product produced domestically. As crude is an input to refineries, no excise duties 
are chargeable on crude.  
Appendix 1.6 shows the revision of customs duty on crude over the years and table 1.3 
below shows the realization of customs duty on crude oil over the years. 
 
Other Taxes and Levies on Crude 
 
Other taxes or levies imposed on the movement of crude in some states include recoverable 
and irrecoverable taxes. The recoverable taxes include VAT (Value Added Tax) and the 
irrecoverable taxes include entry tax or octroi levied on the movement of crude in some 
states and faced by the refineries. Tables 1.4 and 1.5 below show the entry/octroi tax and 
VAT or sales tax respectively faced by the refineries across the states. Till May 2008, 24 
states had VAT levied on the sale of crude. However, due to spiraling crude prices, from 
July 2008 onwards all the states have removed the levy (with the exception of Andhra 
Pradesh and Maharashtra).  
 
 
Table 1.3: Year-wise Realisation of Customs Duties on Crude (in Rs. crore) 
 
Year Customs Duties 
1990-91 3145 
1999-00 6257 
2001-02 4818 
2002-03 6820 
2003-04 7491 
2004-05 9761 
2005-06 7158 
2006-07 7583 
2007-08 9001 
Source: Petroleum Statistics at a Glance < available at mopng.nic.in> 
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Table 1.4: Rate of State-wise Irrecoverable Taxes on Crude (in percent) 
State Irrecoverable Tax  
Maharashtra 2.00  (BMC* Octroi) 
Uttar Pradesh 4.00  (Entry Tax) 
Haryana 4.00  (Local Area Development Tax) 
Karnataka 1.00  (Entry Tax) 
Bihar 2.00  (Entry Tax) 
          * Bombay Metropolitan Corporation 
Source: Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell (PPAC), MoPNG 
 
 
Table 1.5: Rate of State-wise Recoverable Sales Tax (VAT) on Crude  
(in percent) 
 
State 
VAT (as of 
01.04.08) 
VAT 
(updated as 
of 01.07.08) 
Andhra Pradesh 4 4 
Arunachal Pradesh 12.5  
Assam 4  
Bihar 4  
Chattishgarh 4  
Delhi 4  
Goa 20  
Gujarat 4  
Haryana 4  
Himachal Pradesh 4  
Jharkhand 4  
Karnataka 4  
Kerala 4  
Madhya Pradesh 4  
Maharashtra 4(WML*) 4 (WML*) 
Manipur 4  
Mizoram 4  
Nagaland 4  
Orissa 12.5  
Tamilnadu 4  
Uttar Pradesh 4  
Uttaranchal  4  
West Bengal 4  
                            *WML-Within Municipality Limits 
Source: Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell (PPAC), MoPNG 
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The refineries that face the irrecoverable taxes are Bharat Petroleum and Hindustan 
Petroleum of Mumbai in Maharashtra, Indian Oil in Mathura, Uttar Pradesh; Indian Oil in 
Panipat, Haryana; Mangalore Refineries in Karnataka; and Indian Oil in Barauni, Bihar.  
 
1.5.2  Petroleum Products 
 
1.5.2.1  Pricing  
 
Crude Oil, both indigenous and imported are refined into various petroleum products viz. 
petrol (motor spirit), naptha, light diesel (light distillates), aviation fuel, kerosene, high speed 
diesel (middle distillates), furnace oil, bitumen, waxes, etc. (heavy distillates).  Appendix 1.1 
shows the products by end-use.  
The pricing of refined petroleum products have gone through various phases beginning from 
Valued Stock Accounting System (explained briefly before) and import parity pricing and 
then to retention pricing under APM. The petroleum industry has now been deregulated with 
the intention of shifting to market determined pricing mechanism. However, in practice, the 
deregulation process has only been partially implemented due to the restriction on pricing 
imposed by the Government in order to shield the Indian consumers from price rise 
especially since 2004. 
As has been already indicated before, although the process of deregulation of the petroleum 
product prices began in 1998, five sensitive products namely petrol, diesel, domestic LPG, 
PDS, Kerosene and ATF (aviation turbine fuel) continued as controlled commodities. In the 
post-APM era beginning from 1.4.2002, oil marketing companies were allowed to sell their 
products at market-determined prices (based on the notion of import parity from April 2002 
to May 2006 and from June 5, 2006 onwards on the basis of trade parity) for petrol and 
diesel (except PDS kerosene and domestic LPG which continued to be subsidized) after prior 
consultations with the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MoPNG). The subsidy 
schemes pertaining to the post-APM era beginning April 1, 2002 are described in details in 
section 1.5.2.3 devoted subsidies. But before one gets into a discussion of subsidies and 
taxes on petroleum products in the post-APM era, it is essential to understand the notion of 
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import parity pricing and trade parity pricing of petroleum products and the rationale behind 
these pricing mechanisms.  
 
Import Parity Pricing  
The oil marketing companies have two sources for obtaining petroleum products, viz. 
imports and/or procurement from domestic refineries.  
Import-parity price of the petroleum products basically means the price that the actual 
importer would pay for the imported product. The pricing of petroleum products on ‘import 
parity’ basis at refinery gate is basically aimed at bringing parity in the cost of product 
procurement from various sources. The various notional components of the import parity 
price of the petroleum products are: 
• FOB price as quoted in Arab Gulf Market and as reported in Platts and Argus 
• Premium / discount as published in Platts or Argus 
• Ocean freight from mid-port in the Arab Gulf to Indian ports 
• Insurance 
• Exchange rate 
• Custom Duty 
• Ocean Loss 
• Wharfage and Port Charges  
  
The retail selling prices of petroleum products from April 2002 to May 2006 were based on 
this notional price at which these products would have been imported into the country i.e. 
notional landed cost and not on the basis of actual ex-refinery price of these products. Table 
1.6 below illustrates the methodology of calculating the notional landed cost of petrol and 
diesel on the basis of the principle of import parity. 
 
Other components in the price-buildup over and above the landed cost or import parity price 
till the ex-storage point selling price for petrol and diesel are: 
 
1) Cost of Marketing covers compensation for the following elements: 
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a) Marketing related infrastructure handling and maintenance cost excluding 
depreciation 
b) Salaries and wages of employees in the operating locations 
 
2) Marketing Margins comprise return on net fixed assets, employed in the marketing 
of petrol and diesel. This element is meant to provide for future investment on or 
replacement of infrastructure for storage, handling and marketing of petrol or diesel. 
The marketing margin had, however, been frozen at the level applicable during 
March 2002, the last month under APM. 
 
3) Return on working capital The working capital requirement is generally considered 
as 20 days cost of sales excluding depreciation. The interest on working capital is 
usually considered as the prevailing Prime Lending Rate (PLR)27 of State Bank of 
India (SBI). The return on working capital is thus computed as working capital 
multiplied by the SBI PLR.  
 
4) Stock Loss: The various factors that contribute to the product loss during handling 
operations at various terminals and depots are – evaporation due to volatile nature of 
products; leakage/spillage; human error due to gauging operation or improper 
calibration of delivery equipments; pilferage of products. All these are considered 
under stock loss. 
 
5) Retail Pump Outlet (RPO) Charges include oil marketing companies’ operating 
costs and return on investments pertaining only to retail pump outlets. There has been 
no revision in the rate since April 2002. 
                                                            
27   A short-term interest rate quoted by a commercial bank is an indication of the rate being charged on loans 
to its best commercial customers. Even though banks frequently charge more and sometimes less than the 
quoted prime rate, it is a benchmark against which other rates are measured and often keyed. 
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Table 1.6: Methodology of calculating the landed cost of petrol/diesel on import parity 
basis 
S.No. Cost Component Unit Basis of Computation 
1 FOB Value $/barrel Average of mean of high and low quotes of Platts Asia 
Pacific Arab Gulf (APAG) and Petroleum Argus Asia Pacific 
Products Report for Arab Gulf market during the “pricing 
period”.  
2. Premium/Discount $/barrel Monthly average of spot premium/discounts for the same 
period as FOB as published in Argus/Platts for motor spirit 
(MS) or high speed diesel (HSD) 
3. Ocean Freight 
(Converted by using 
conversion factor 7.90 
bbl per MT) 
$/barrel World Scale freight rates from Bahrain (Sitra) to the 
designated Indian ports adjusted by AFRA (Average Freight 
Rate Assessment) for MR (Medium Range) vessel size. The 
designated ports for MS/HSD are Jamnagar, Mumbai, Kochi 
and non-refinery ports are Kandla and Paradeep. Additional 
AFRA of 50 points is added for Haldia port in view of higher 
crude freight cost due to port constraints.  
4. C&F Price $/KL Total of 1 to 3 above (Converted to KL using conversion 
factor of 6.2898 bbl per KL) 
5. Insurance $/KL Actual applicable tariff rates set by GIC (General Insurance 
Corporation) 
6. CIF Price $/KL Total of 4 and 5 above 
7. Exchange Rate Rs/$ Monthly average (for the same period as FOB) of the 
available RBI reference rates during the pricing period 
8. CIF Price Rs/KL Converted to Indian rupees 
9. Customs Duty Rs/KL As applicable. Assessable value for calculation of customs 
duty would include the CIF price and landing charges at 1% 
in line with the customs rules. 
10. Ocean Loss Rs/KL As permitted under the APM 
11. Wharfage, Port 
Charges, Landing 
Charges, Bank 
Charges etc. 
Rs/KL Dues applicable for the port based on the official tariff rates 
of the respective ports or nearest government port, in case of 
a private port, whichever is lower. Bank charges at the 
prevailing rates as assessed by SBI. 
12. Landed Cost (Import 
Parity Price)  
Rs/KL Total of 8 to 11 above 
Source: Zutshi (2005) and Gazette Notification Ref. P-20029/18/2001-PP dated 28 January 2003 
 
33 
 
 
6) Freight: Freight equalisation was a feature of the APM period. However even in the 
post-APM era oil marketing companies recover weighted average cost of 
transportation on import parity basis i.e. from the nearest port to storage depot on an 
equalized basis for all locations in the country28. Inclusion of equalized freight 
ensures that the impact of high transportation costs for inland location or far-flung 
areas are contained.  
 
7) Domestic Logistic Adjustment Factor (DLAF) Depending upon the availability of 
product at the refineries and the markets attached to those refineries for the purpose 
of pricing, petrol or diesel would likely be moved from other refineries to meet the 
requirement of the customers. Such movements would lead to additional logistic cost 
to the oil companies. This comes under DLAF. In practice, however, this rate has 
also been frozen at the level applicable since April 2002. 
 
8) Terminalling Charges: Terminalling charges are considered for compensation to 
refineries towards providing facilities for marketing activities in price build up of 
petrol and diesel from the time when administered price was withdrawn. These 
charges also remained frozen since that time. 
 
9) RPO Surcharge: Some of the dealers who procure supplies from marketing 
companies make payments by demand drafts. Commission paid to dealers does not 
take this element into account as it is assumed that those payments have been made 
by cheque. As the dealers incur charges for making these demand drafts, the 
additional cost incurred by them is compensated by reimbursing them and including 
this element in the retail selling price. These charges were included in the price 
buildup even during APM.  
 
                                                            
28   For smaller non-refinery ports like Goa import parity price are fixed based on coastal freight from the 
nearest port refinery. Refinery gate prices at inland refineries, viz. Mathura, Panipat, Barauni and Koyali 
are fixed based on 75% of rail freight from the nearest refinery/non-refinery port. Refinery gate prices for 
North East refineries are at par with import parity price for Haldia refinery (Zutshi, 2005). 
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10) Delivery Charges Under-recovery:  This is included in price build up of both petrol 
and diesel towards under realization in transportation charges from the oil 
companies’ storage depot to the dealers’ retail outlets. 
 
Appendix 1.7 illustrates the various elements of costs in the price build up as explained 
above by using value for each of these components in the ex-storage price of petrol and as of 
November 2006.  
It needs to be noted that the basic ex-storage selling price was uniform at all refinery 
locations throughout the country and as per the existing arrangement between oil marketing 
companies and refineries this basic price at refinery level on import parity basis used to be 
revised on fortnightly basis from 2002 till 2004 depending upon the prevailing international 
prices. 
 
The retail selling price of petrol/diesel for the consumer in the post-APM era on the basis of 
import parity is arrived at from ex-storage point selling price by adding delivery charges 
from storage depot to retail pump outlets (considered as the notional rail freight of the APM 
period), state specific sales tax/VAT plus irrecoverable levies, excise duty, education cess 
and dealer commission to the ex-storage point selling prices (see table 1.7 below). 
 
Table 1.7: Build-up from Ex-storage Point Selling Price to Retail Selling Price 
Ex-Storage Point Price Common at all Refineries
Freight Notional Rail Freight pertaining to APM period
State Specific Cost  At rates applicable for respective states 
Sales tax/VAT At rates applicable for respective states 
Dealer commission Retail and wholesale as decided by state 
governments 
Selling Price at Location Total of Above
 
As ex-storage point selling price is uniform throughout the country the variation in retail 
selling price at different locations is attributed to distance of the RPO from refineries, rate of 
sales taxes and other recoverable or irrecoverable local levies.  
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In case of PDS kerosene and domestic LPG the government had decided that the subsidies 
on these products would be specified on a flat rate basis for each depot/bottling plant and 
would be met from the fiscal budget. Appendices 1.8 and 1.9 show the price build-up till ex-
storage point selling price or cost price at depot on the basis of import parity for PDS 
kerosene and domestic LPG respectively. The items corresponding to serial no. 1 to 12 
indicates the components that are required to be taken account of to arrive at the landed cost 
or import parity price or refinery transfer price and are same as in case of petrol and diesel. 
 
1.5.2.2   Major Changes in Prices of Petroleum Products in Post-APM Era: A 
Chronological Examination 
 
Initially from 1 April 2002 till about the end of December, 2003, the companies used to set 
the prices of petrol and diesel every fortnight and they were doing so because the crude 
market and the petroleum market were relatively stable. But during that period, any hike in 
retail selling price of PDS Kerosene and domestic LPG had been spared by oil marketing 
companies. Appendix 1.10 shows the major revisions that had been undertaken with respect 
to the retail selling prices of petrol, diesel, domestic LPG and PDS kerosene between April 
2002 and December 2003. As evident from Appendix 1.10, between April 1 2002 and 
January 1 2004, there were 23 price revisions that had been carried out on the prices on 
petrol and diesel. Out of those revisions 8 were price-cuts and 15 were price increases and 
the overall impact was to raise the retail selling price of petrol by 27 percent and that of 
diesel by 31 percent over the period considering Delhi as a benchmark for India (see table 
1.8). Table 1.8 shows the retail selling prices of petrol, diesel, PDS kerosene and domestic 
LPG in Rs/litre and also in cents per litre. It could be seen from the table that there is a 
difference of just 7 to 9 % in the rate of growth in the prices when expressed in Indian 
currency or in cents. During the same period the price of crude petroleum (Brent and Indian 
Basket of Crude29) had risen by 24 per cent and prices of petrol and diesel between 19 and  
                                                            
29   Brent is a type of sweet crude which comes from the Ninian Basin, UK and is usually considered as the 
world marker for crude. The Indian basket of crude comprises two kinds of crude oil: Oman-Dubai sour 
grade crude comprising nearly 58 per cent out of total imports and Brent sweet crude comprising nearly 42 
per cent out of total imports. Weighted average price of both types of oil means the price of India's crude 
basket. The weights assigned may vary from year to year depending on the proportion of imports of each 
type of crude in the total import basket. 
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Table 1.8 Domestic Selling Prices of Refined Petroleum Products 
 Mar02 Dec-03 Change 
Domestic Retail prices Rs per Litre 
Motor Spirit 26.54 33.70 27% 
High Speed Diesel 16.59 21.73 31% 
PDS Kerosene 8.98 9.01 0.3% 
Domestic Retail Prices** US cents per Litre 
Motor Spirit 54.42 73.95 36% 
High Speed Diesel 34.02 47.68 40% 
PDS Kerosene 18.41 19.77 7.4% 
LPG (domestic) Per  14.2 Kg cylinder 
Rupees 240.45 240.45 0.0% 
US cents 493.03 527.42 6.9% 
Source: GoI (2008) 
Note:  **Average exchange rate (INR per US$): 48.77 for March 2002; 45.57 for December 2003 
 
Table 1.9: Changes in International Prices of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum 
Products 
(March 2002 to December 2003) 
Items Mar 2002 Dec 2003 Percentage 
Change  US $ per barrel US $ per barrel 
Crude Oil    
Indian Basket 23.31 28.97 24.28 
Brent 22.64 29.44 30.04 
Motor Spirit (Petrol)       
New York Harbour 29.31 37.17 26.82 
US Gulf Coast 29.99 35.83 19.47 
Amsterdam 25.52 33.78 32.37 
Singapore 27.97 39.32 40.58 
High Speed Diesel       
New York Harbour 27.07 37.5 38.53 
US Gulf Coast 26.41 35.77 35.44 
Amsterdam 25.52 33.78 32.37 
Singapore 27.97 39.32 40.58 
ATF/Kerosene       
New York Harbour 27.23 38.53 41.50 
Amsterdam 27.07 37.37 38.05 
Singapore 25.29 39.61 56.62 
LPG/Propane       
US Mont Bellevue Texas 15.96 26.38 65.29 
North West Europe-Amsterdam/Rotterdam 15.88 25.03 57.62 
Source: GoI (2008) 
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41 per cent (see table 1.9). This, in a way, indicates that the changes in retail selling prices of 
petrol and diesel in India (Delhi) during this period have more or less been in line with the 
changes in international prices. The regime of central and state taxes remained broadly 
unchanged during this period. The retail selling prices of both PDS Kerosene and domestic 
LPG also remained virtually unchanged during this period.   
 
In 2004, the oil prices started rising in the international market. Although the oil marketing 
companies were granted freedom to fix retail selling prices on fortnightly basis, the prices 
used to be revised after informal clearance from MoPNG and there was no price revision of 
petrol and diesel during the period 1 January to 15 June 2004 although the ruling prices in 
the international market were abnormally high during this period. Same was the case with 
PDS kerosene and domestic LPG. But with effect from 16 June 2004 finally moderate 
increases to the extent of Rs. 2 per litre on petrol and Re 1 per litre on diesel were made 
coupled with excise duty changes. Retail selling price of domestic LPG too was raised by 
Rs. 20 but PDS kerosene was again spared of any hike. 
 
Government worked out a new methodology with effect from 1
 
August 2004 allowing 
OMCs limited freedom to revise the price of petrol/diesel within a price band. The concept 
of price band was based on the principles of rolling average prices of these products in the 
international markets. Accordingly, oil companies were permitted to carry out autonomous 
adjustments in prices within a band of +/- 10% of the mean of rolling average CIF prices of 
preceding 12 months and preceding quarter, i.e. three months. In case of breach of this band, 
the OMCs had to approach the Ministry of Finance (MoF) through Ministry of Petroleum 
and Natural Gas (MoPNG) to modulate the excise duty rates so that the spiraling prices 
prevailing in the international markets do not cause undue hardships to the consumers. 
However, consequent to further rise in the international prices the price band approach had 
to be given up. 
 
In fact the year 2004-05 witnessed unprecedented high oil prices in the international market. 
As compared to the average Indian basket crude price of US$ 27.98/ barrel during 2003-04, 
the average price during 2004-05 was US $39.22/barrel. During February and March 2005, 
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these prices geared up to US $ 42.58/barrel and US $ 49.27/barrel respectively. To contain 
the impact of increase in international prices of petroleum products on domestic prices, the 
Government reduced excise duty on petrol from 30% to 26% and on diesel from 14% to 
11% with effect from 16 June 2004. The excise duty was further reduced on petrol from 26% 
to 23% and on diesel from 11% to 8% with effect from 19 August 2004. The Government 
also reduced customs duty on petrol and diesel from 20% to 15% with effect from 19 August 
2004. In addition to the aforesaid changes in duties on petrol and diesel, the excise duty on 
LPG (Domestic) was reduced from 16 per cent to 8 per cent with effect from 16 June 2004 
and the excise duty on PDS Kerosene was reduced from 16 per cent to 12 per cent with 
effect from 19 August 2004. 
 
However, the international prices went up further during the month of October, 2004. 
With the under-recoveries30 on petrol and diesel estimated at around Rs. 3000 crores for the 
period April to October 2004, further increases were announced with effect from 5 
November 2004. Retail selling price of petrol was fixed in line with the import parity price. 
The retail price of petrol was further revised downwards in line with international prices 
with effect from 16 November 2004. However, the increase in the diesel retail price was 
pegged at 50% of the level of increase required on the basis of import parity and no further 
increase was made in the diesel price on 16 November 2004.  
 
The retail selling price of LPG (Packed Domestic) was revised by the OMCs with 
effect from 16
 
June, 2004 and again on 5
 
November, 2004 by Rs. 20 per cylinder each time, 
in view of the abnormally high prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the 
international market. But the retail selling price of PDS kerosene remained untouched since 
April, 2002.  
                                                            
30   In the oil sector, under-recoveries and losses are often used interchangeably. This is not correct as they are 
two distinct concepts. Refining of crude oil is a process industry where crude oil constitutes around 90% of 
the total cost. Since value added is relatively small, determination of individual product-wise prices 
becomes problematic. The oil marketing companies (OMCs) were initially sourcing their products from 
the refineries on import parity basis which then became their cost price. The difference between the cost 
price and the realized price represented the under-recoveries of the OMCs. The under-recoveries so 
computed are different from the actual profits and losses of the oil companies as per their published results. 
The latter takes into account other income streams like dividend income, pipeline income, inventory 
changes, and profits from freely priced products and refining margins in the case of integrated companies. 
The issue has been explained in greater details in the latter section on financial repercussions of 
dismantling on the oil companies. 
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In the Budget 2005-06, however, the following changes had been announced with 
effect from 1 March 2005:- 
 
Table 1.10: Changes made in Customs and Excise Duties under Union Budget 2005-06 
Item  Pre-revised 
(as on 28.2.2005) 
Revised 
(as on 1.3.2005) 
Customs tariff  
Crude Oil  10%  5%  
Petrol  15%  10%  
Diesel  15%  10%  
Kerosene  5%  NIL  
LPG  5%  NIL  
Others  20%  10%  
Excise Tariffs  
Petrol  23%+Rs.7.50/Ltr.  8%+Rs.13/Ltr.  
Diesel  8%+Rs.1.50 /Ltr.  8%+Rs.3.25/Ltr.  
PDS Kerosene  12% NIL 
Domestic LPG  8% NIL 
                         Source: indiabudget.nic.in 
 
With the customs and excise tariffs revised in the above lines, the road cess increased by Rs. 
0.50 from Rs. 1.50, and as the international prices of crude and petroleum products geared 
high up, the prices of petroleum products were revised again on 21 June 2005 by the 
Government, with a hike of Rs. 2.50/Litre for petrol and Rs. 2.00/Litre for diesel in Delhi. 
Although the prices of petrol and diesel were increased further by Rs 3.00/litre and Rs 
2.00/litre at Delhi on 7 September 2005, the selling price of PDS Kerosene continued to 
remain at the level as it was on 1 April 2002. 
 
On account of these little or almost no revisions in the prices of petrol and diesel, and 
persistent non-revision of PDS kerosene and domestic LPG prices, the profitability of oil 
companies got eroded in 2004/05 and 2005/06. In 2005/06 the financial position of the PSU 
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oil refining and marketing companies became all the more worse and they would have made 
huge losses had there not been any transfers from upstream companies and subsidies from 
the Government to compensate for that. The oil companies reported their financial distress in 
terms of “under recoveries” with respect to the import parity formula that has been in use 
ever since the end of the APM regime. A separate section has been devoted latter to a 
discussion on financial repercussions for the oil companies in the post-APM era between 
2003 and 2008 on account of asymmetric price adjustment between international crude oil 
prices and domestic prices of sensitive petroleum products in the light of the more recent 
report of the High Powered Committee on Financial Position of Oil Companies which came 
out in June 2008 (see GoI, 2008). 
 
In view of the rapidly deteriorating financial position of the oil companies and with the 
objective of conserving petroleum products and establishing a transparent mechanism for 
autonomous adjustment of prices by the oil companies, the Government on 26th October 
2005 set up a committee under the chairmanship of C. Rangarajan to examine various 
aspects of pricing and taxation of petroleum products with a view to stabilizing or 
rationalizing their prices. The committee identified following three areas for detailed study 
in order to meet the objectives set out in the terms of reference: 
 Alternative models for pricing of petroleum products; 
 Taxes and duties on crude oil and petroleum products; 
 Subsidies on PDS kerosene and domestic LPG. 
Box 1.1 provides the key recommendations made by the committee (see GoI, 2006) relating 
to pricing of petrol, diesel, kerosene and LPG. 
Prior to the Rangarajan’s Committee the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Petroleum 
and Natural Gas analysed and deliberated on oil pricing in much greater details. The 
committee’s sixth (GoI, 2005) and tenth (GoI, 2006 a1) reports contain a number of far-
reaching recommendations related to the pricing of both crude oil and petroleum products. 
Some of the major recommendations of the Committee are given in Box 1.2  
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Box 1.1 
Major Recommendations of Rangarajan Committee on Pricing and Taxation of Petroleum Products 
i. Shift to a trade parity pricing formula for determining refinery gate as well as retail prices. The weights 
recommended for import and export parity prices are 80 and 20 respectively. These prices would also 
be port-specific. 
ii. Government should keep away from price determination and allow flexibility to oil companies in 
fixing the retail price under the proposed formula. This would encourage a competitive market to the 
advantage of the consumers. 
iii. The details of the pricing methodology should be placed in the public domain for the sake of 
transparency. 
iv. The concept of freight equalization should no longer be adopted. In the case of remote, inaccessible 
areas, by way of an exception, the government should devise a special approach to soften the impact of 
the cost of freight in an explicit manner. 
v. While the customs duties on crude might be retained at 5 per cent, the duty on petrol and diesel should 
be reduced to 7.5 per cent so as to reduce the ERP to about 20 per cent from the existing 40 per cent. 
Also, customs duty on industrial products other than petrol and diesel might be retained at 10 per cent 
“in order to protect domestic producers who pay sales tax as compared to direct importers”. However, 
customs duties on the industrial products should also be reduced to 7.5 per cent if any additional duty is 
introduced to neutralise the incidence of state level taxes. 
vi. Excise duties on petrol and diesel (inclusive of road cess) should be restructured from the present mix 
of specific and ad-valorem to a pure specific levy and calibrating the levies at Rs. 5.00 per litre for 
diesel and Rs. 14.75 per litre for petrol. Education cess would be on top of this. 
vii. The states should be persuaded to adopt a uniform policy on sales tax on petroleum products in order to 
minimize distortions in pricing. 
This set of recommendations, as underscored by the committee, should be implemented as an integrated 
package as the committee expressed concerns that selective implementation might create more distortions. 
The set of recommendations relating to pricing of domestic LPG and PDS kerosene, includes, among others:  
i. Restrict subsidized kerosene to BPL families only;  
ii. Raise the price of domestic LPG at one go by Rs. 75/cylinder; the price should thereafter be gradually 
adjusted towards the market price. 
iii. Discontinue the practice of asking ONGC/GAIL/OIL to provide upstream assistance, but instead 
collecting their contribution by raising the OIDB cess to Rs. 4,800/MT; and  
iv. Government to meet the balance cost of subsidy from the budget.  
This set of recommendations should also be implemented as an integrated package as the committee emphasized 
that partial implementation would not yield sustainable results. 
 
42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While the Parliamentary Committee’s recommendations were more comprehensive as they 
brought under their ambit both the pricing of crude and petroleum products, Rangarajan 
Committee recommendations dealt only with product pricing. However, on comparing the 
recommendations of the two committees it becomes clear that both these committees were in 
favour of moving away from the import parity principle and in adoption of specific rates of 
excise duties on products instead of ad-valorem duties. Rangarajan’s report also 
recommended some reduction in the customs duty differential between crude and products. 
This, as the report underscored, would be instrumental in reducing the refinery margin to a 
considerable extent. The recommended measure is quite in concordance with what the 
Parliamentary Committee had also proposed, even though the latter underscored on complete 
Box 1.2 
Some Major Recommendations of Parliamentary Standing Committee on Petroleum and Natural Gas 
 
 
i. The method of adding notional costs such as ocean freight, insurance, customs duty, ocean loss, 
port dues, etc, to the FOB price of the respective marker crude in the international market in 
arriving at the import price of domestic crude is creating unnecessary distortions in pricing and 
providing a high rent to the refiners and should be done away with. The price should be pegged at 
the FOB price to encourage competition. 
 
ii. The cess collected on crude should be used exclusively for the purpose for which it has been 
created. A price stabilization fund should be created from it to cushion the market volatility and 
provide price stability for the consumer. 
 
iii. The states should be persuaded to switch back from ad valorem to a specific rate of royalty on 
crude. 
 
iv. The present basis for fixing the refinery-gate price on the basis of import parity should be done 
away with. Even if the import parity basis were to be retained, it should be pegged at the FOB 
price, without adding any notional costs such as ocean freight, insurance, etc.  
 
v. There should be a ceiling on the refinery margins earned by the refining companies. 
 
vi. Excise duties should be at specific rates, not on an ad valorem basis. 
 
vii. There should be no duty differential between crude oil and petroleum products (see footnote 28 for 
an explanation on why the duty differential provides undue rent to refiners). 
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elimination of the differential. However, the concept of “trade parity”31, as proposed by 
Rangarajan’s Committee, was of an innovative nature to oil pricing in the Indian context. 
 
The government accepted trade parity pricing in principle for refinery gate as well as retail 
pricing and proposed to review and update the trade parity price every year depending on the 
relative weight of exports and imports. The new pricing mechanism came into effect from 
June 16, 2006. The government also reduced the customs duty differential between crude 
and products by reducing the custom duties on petrol and diesel to 7.5 percent from 10 
percent and retaining that of crude at 5 percent. The Government further decided to share the 
burden of not making full adjustment in domestic retail prices due to high oil prices through 
the principle of equitable burden sharing by proposing to bear Rs 28,300 crore in the form of 
oil bonds during 2006-07. Regarding the provision of full flexibility to oil companies in 
determining domestic prices of sensitive petroleum products, however, the government 
expressed concern especially in view of the volatile international scenario with frequent oil 
spikes. The government also accepted in principle the need to restrict kerosene subsidy to 
BPL families. 
 
The government, however, did not accept the recommendations on complete de-
subsidisation of LPG, adoption of specific rates of excise duty on products and doing away 
with freight rate equalisation. Regarding domestic LPG, the government contended that 
subsidy should be phased out gradually or at least substantially reduced. The government 
however expressed concerns that strong political consensus would be needed for 
implementing the same.  
 
                                                            
31   Import parity price reflects the price in the domestic market as if the products are actually imported. This is 
the price that would have been applicable had there been no domestic refining capacity. In a situation in 
which there is adequate domestic refining capacity, the import parity price could be viewed as an indicative 
ceiling for the domestic prices in a competitive environment. When there is a protective customs duty 
differential for products, it implied an effective rate of protection (ERP) that allowed an element of rent for 
the domestic refiners. Export parity pricing could be an alternative way to price the products. Using the 
same logic as for import parity, it would imply the price at which a domestic exporter would be able to 
export the products in a competitive market, after obtaining the same by refining imported crude in a 
domestic refinery. If import parity could be viewed as a ceiling, export parity could be viewed as the floor 
for pricing products. Trade parity pricing is the weighted average of import and export parity prices in the 
ratio of imports and exports in respect of a given product. In trade parity, pricing is thus lower than the 
import parity to the extent of the freight cost, customs duty and other tax or duty (see GoI, 2006 for details). 
44 
 
The report of the Rangarajan Committee also pointed out that contrary to most of the 
developed countries large disparity existed between excise duties of petrol and diesel. The 
contrarian trend in Indian economy led to inefficient substitution of one fuel for another and 
hence the disparity was urgently needed to be rectified.  
 
Regarding the aforesaid disparity the MoPNG, however, contended that taxes on 
transportation fuels – petrol, diesel and ATF was needed to be realigned keeping in mind the 
ability of the consumers to shoulder the burden.  In fact from the excise duties as of 1 August 
2006 (as shown in table 1.11) it could be observed that the policy was seemingly favouring 
airline travelers who perhaps could afford higher taxation in contrast to people who travel by 
buses in public transport or on rail. However, in the subsequent Union Budget for 2007-08 
the government reduced the ad valorem component of the excise duty on both petrol and 
diesel from 8 to 6 percent.  
 
Table 1.11 : Excise Duties on Petrol, Diesel as of 1 August, 2006 
Transportation 
Fuel 
Excise Duty32 Consumers 
Petrol Rs.13/Ltr + 8 percent 
(Rs 15.18/litre) 
Mainly owners of two wheelers 
and cars 
Diesel Rs.3.25/Ltr. + 8 percent 
(Rs 5.20/litre) 
Trucks, public transport, 
railways and farmers 
ATF 8 percent 
(Rs 2.66/litre) 
 Airline travelers 
       Source: GoI (2006b) 
 
If one considers the variation in crude and refined petroleum product prices from January 
2004 to June 2008, then it could be observed that prices of Indian basket of crude have 
increased by 348 per cent while that of UK Brent increased by nearly 344 per cent. During 
the same period the prices of refined petroleum products at important global hubs increased 
                                                            
32 Excise duty as on 1.8.2006, includes education cess. 
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by 257 to 284 per cent for gasoline (petrol or motor spirit), by 333 to 364 per cent for HSD 
and by 339 to 370 per cent for kerosene or jet fuel. The price increase of propane (LPG) was 
around 190 to 200 per cent (see table 1.12 for details). Contrary to that, during the same 
period the retail selling prices of petrol (motor spirit) in Delhi (considering Delhi as a 
benchmark) was increased by just 50 percent from Rs. 33.70 to Rs. 50.56 per litre, while the 
price of diesel (HSD) was increased by 60 percent from Rs. 21.73 to Rs. 34.80 per litre. 
While the price of PDS Kerosene remained virtually unaltered during this period the price of 
domestic LPG was raised by just 44 percent through introduction of four charges over the 
period from Rs 261.60 per cylinder (weight 14 kg) to Rs. 346.30 per cylinder (see table 1.13 
for details). In fact over the time span beginning from January 2004 and ending in June 2008  
 
Table 1.12: Change in Crude oil and Price of Refined Petroleum Products  
(December 2003 to June 2008) 
 
 Dec-03 June-08 Change 
Crude  Oil US $ per barrel 
Indian Basket 28.97 129.72 348% 
UK Brent  29.81 132.32 344% 
Petro  Products US $ per barrel 
Motor Spirit    
New York  Harbour 37.17 138.27 272% 
US Gulf  Coast 35.83 137.92 285% 
Amsterdam  33.78 129.73 284% 
Singapore 39.32 140. 46 257% 
High Speed Diesel    
New York Harbour 37.50 162.26 333% 
US Gulf coast 35.77 160.52 349% 
Amsterdam  35.76 164.73 361% 
Singapore 35.07 162.88   364% 
A T F / Kerosene     
New York Harbour 38.53 162.73 339% 
Amsterdam 37.37 166.41 365% 
Singapore 39.61 164.85   370% 
LPG/Propane     
US Mont Bellevue  Texas 26.38 76.15 189% 
North West Europe Amsterdam/Rotterdam 25.03 74.89 199% 
     Source: PPAC, GoI (2008) 
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the domestic prices of automotive fuels (petrol and diesel) had been changed twelve times 
consisting of an increase for ten times and reduction on only two occasions. In addition to 
these changes, prices in Delhi were changed on three occasions (hiked twice and reduced for 
once) due to changes in VAT rates, introduction of pollution cess on HSD and revision in 
dealer commission rates on petrol and diesel respectively (see Appendix 1.11 for details). 
Over the aforementioned period the Indian rupee vis a vis US dollar appreciated by nearly 
6.6 percent (from 45.57 INR per US$ for December 2003 to 42.76 INR per US$ for June 
2008).  
 
Table 1.13: Domestic Selling Prices of Refined Petroleum Products (December 2003 and June 
2008) and Percentage Change  
 
 December 2003 June 2008 Change 
Domestic Retail 
prices* 
Rs per litre 
Motor Spirit  33.70 50.56 50% 
High Speed Diesel  21.73 34.80 60% 
PDS Kerosene  9.01 9.09 0.9% 
Domestic Retail 
Prices** 
US cents per Litre 
Motor Spirit  73.95 118.24 60% 
High Speed Diesel 47.68 81.38 71% 
PDS Kerosene  19.77 21.26 7.5% 
LPG (domestic)*^ Per  14.2 Kg cylinder 
Rupees 240.45 304.70 27% 
US cents 527.42 723.31 37% 
    Notes:   
     *   At Delhi – last column subsequent to revisions on June 4, 2008. 
** Average exchange rate (INR per US$): 45.57 for December 2003 and 42.76 for June 
2008. 
^  Selling price of LPG cylinder at Delhi with effect from June 4, 2008 is inclusive of Rs 40 
per cylinder provided by the Delhi State government. This is , the domestic selling prices 
of LPG cylinder  in other parts of the count –have  gone up by 43(in rupees) and 52 per 
cent (in US dollars) between December 2003 and June 2008 in other parts of the country. 
 
Source: GoI (2008) 
 
In order to take account of the variation in exchange rate  and make the comparison at par 
with the variation in international price of refined petroleum products the retail selling prices 
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of Indian refined petroleum products in Indian rupee have also been converted to US dollar 
(cents) and is shown separately in table 1.13. 
In comparison to the prices in Rs/litre the variation in the price has been observed as only 6 
to 10 percent higher when converted to US cents per litre.  
 
1.5.  Post-APM Subsidy on Petroleum Products: A Discussion 
 
Immediately after dismantling of APM, the MoPNG approved the following subsidy 
schemes which were to be met from the budgetary grants of the ministry 
 
1. PDS Kerosene and Domestic LPG Subsidy Scheme: This subsidy scheme came into 
effect from 1 April 2002.33 The subsidy under this scheme was provided on the sales 
undertaken by participating companies (IOC, HPC, BPC and IBP)34 of kerosene under 
PDS and LPG cylinders for domestic use throughout the country. The quantity of PDS 
kerosene on which subsidy was allowed for each state was limited to the allocations made 
by MoPNG subject to actual quantities sold.  
The amount of subsidy per unit sold as of April, 2002 was calculated as the difference 
between the cost price and the issue price35 per selling unit and was computed ex-depot 
for PDS kerosene and ex-bottling plant for domestic LPG. Furthermore, it was decided 
that the subsidy per selling unit for any depot or bottling plant effective from 1 April 2002 
would be frozen and would remain unchanged for the financial year 2002-03. The subsidy 
admissible under this scheme for 2003-04 was decided at 2/3rd level of the rates 
prevailing during 2002-03 and the subsidy admissible for the subsequent years i.e. 2004-
05, 2005-06 and 2006-07 was allowed at 1/3rd level of the rates of subsidy for 2002-03.  
The cost price of PDS Kerosene for any depot and that of domestic LPG cylinder for any 
bottling plant as of 1 April, 2002, was calculated on import-parity basis as per the 
methodology given in Appendices 1.8 and 1.9. The Government further decided that 
                                                            
33   Gazette Notification Ref. P-20029/18/2001-PP dated 28 January 2003. 
34  IOC-Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., HPC-Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., BPC-Bharat Petroleum 
Corporation Ltd., IBP- Indo-Burma Petroleum Ltd. 
35   The issue price implies the invoice price of the product ex-depot/bottling plant excluding state surcharge, 
excise duty, sales tax, local levies and delivery charges. 
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afterwards any changes in the cost price would be passed on to the consumer price (retail 
selling price).36  
 
Table 1.14: Average Rate of Subsidy allowed from Fiscal Budget in Post-APM Period 
Years   PDS Kerosene 
Domestic  
LPG 
  (Rs./ Litre) (Rs./ Cylinder) 
2002-03  2.45 67.75 
2003-04   1.65 45.18 
2004-05 onwards   0.82 22.58 
   Source: PPAC 
 
In accordance with the phased programme of elimination of subsidies the flat average 
rate of subsidy for 2002-03 and 2003-04 worked out as Rs. 67.75 and Rs. 45.18 per 
cylinder respectively on domestic LPG and Rs. 2.45 and 1.65 per litre respectively on 
PDS kerosene. From 2004-05 onwards the average rate of subsidy allowed was Re. 0.82 
on PDS Kerosene and Rs. 22.58 on Domestic LPG respectively (see table 1.14 above).  
The government subsidy was released to the public sector oil marketing companies on a 
monthly basis after verifying their claims. Fig. 1.2 shows the total subsidy allowed on 
PDS Kerosene and Domestic LPG from Fiscal Budget from 2002-03 till 2007-08. As the 
governmental subsidy provisions were minimal and as the government did not allow the 
revision of retail selling prices of PDS kerosene and domestic LPG in consonance with 
the rise in international crude and petroleum product prices especially after 2004, the 
public sector oil marketing companies (OMCs) had been shouldering a large part of  
                                                            
36    Under the scheme vide notification dated 28 January 2003, the MoPNG proposed that participating 
companies would be allowed to make changes or revisions in the issue price of PDS Kerosene and domestic 
LPG on their own on account of the following changes in cost price: 
i) Any variation in the cost price vis a vis the cost price effective 1 April 2002, due to changes in the 
product price in the international market, ocean freights and inland freights will be given effect to by the 
participating companies, on monthly basis. 
ii) Any change in the rate of duty of customs shall be given effect to from the date of such change. 
iii) Changes in the marketing margins (storage/distribution cost and return on investments) would be made 
on yearly basis and passed on in the consumer prices at the beginning of the financial year. 
Any elements, other than above (amongst the elements given in Appendices 4.8 and 4.9) which might be 
allowed by the MoPNG. (Gazette Notification Ref. P-20029/18/2001-PP dated 28 January 2003) 
49 
 
Fig.1.2: Subsidy Allowed from Fiscal Budget on PDS Kerosene and Domestic LPG 
                    
 
   Source: PPAC 
 
the subsidy by not passing the full increase in the international prices to the domestic 
consumer. They had been doing that by selling the products at prices much less than the 
import parity prices thereby incurring substantial under-recoveries. Additionally, the 
upstream oil majors namely ONGC and OIL; and Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL) 
have also been sharing this subsidy in the form of special discounts to PSU oil 
companies engaged in the business of marketing of products. Fig.s 1.3 and 1.4 shows the 
subsidy on kerosene per litre and on LPG per cylinder and their breakup respectively. 
 
50 
 
Fig.1.3: Subsidy to the Consumers per Litre on PDS Kerosene and Breakup                
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Fig.1.4: Subsidy to the Consumers per Cylinder on Domestic LPG and Breakup 
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2. Freight Subsidy (for Far Flung Areas) Scheme, 2002: This subsidy scheme also came 
into effect from 1 April 2002.37 Under Administered Pricing Mechanism this subsidy 
was met from Oil Pool Account and during post APM period, the subsidy had been given 
from the fiscal budget. The same four companies, as in the case of ‘PDS Kerosene and 
Domestic LPG Subsidy Scheme’ (namely IOC, HPC, BPC and IBP) were allowed to 
participate in this scheme. The freight subsidy on supplies or sales of PDS Kerosene and 
domestic LPG in the far-flung areas38 covered a part of the freight cost in the eligible 
areas upto the wholesale dealer location in the case of PDS Kerosene and upto the LPG 
distributor location, including the extension counters, in the case of domestic LPG. 
The entitlement of subsidy under the scheme from 1 April, 2002 has been limited to the 
freight subsidy available in the eligible areas as on 31 March, 2002 in respect of the 
transportation cost for the distance: 
i) from the bottling plant/depot upto LPG distributor/extension counter/wholesale 
dealer in the far flung area (for the North East) 
ii) from the nearest tap-off point or railhead to the bottling plant or depot and further 
upto LPG distributor/extension counter/wholesale dealer in the far flung area (for 
other far-flung areas)  
It was decided that the freight subsidy effective 1 April 2002 should be frozen and remain 
unchanged for the financial year 2002-03. The subsidy admissible under this scheme for 
2003-04 was at 2/3rd level of rates allowed during 2002-03 and the subsidy admissible for 
2004-05, 2005-06 and 2006-07 was at one-third level of the rates of subsidy for 2002-03. 
Fig. 1.5 below shows the total far flung freight subsidy allowed from the fiscal budget 
from 2002-03 till 2007-08. 
 
                                                            
37    Gazette Notification Ref. P-20029/18/2001-PP dated 28 January 2003. 
38   The ‘far-flung’ areas as specified by the scheme (vide Gazette Notification Ref. P-20029/18/2001-PP 
dated 28 January 2003) were 
i)  North Eastern States including Sikkim, except the districts in which Digboi, Guwahati, Bongaigaon 
and Numaligarh refineries are located. 
ii)  The States of Jammu&Kashmir excluding districts of Jammu and Kathwa, Himachal Pradesh, 
Uttaranchal excluding districts of Haridwar and Udhamsing Nagar; 
iii)  Andaman & Nicobar Islands; 
iv)  Lakshwadweep Islands 
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Fig. 1.5: Total Far Flung Freight Subsidy allowed from Fiscal Budget on PDS Kerosene and 
Domestic LPG                          
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3. The Irrecoverable Taxes Compensation Scheme, 200239: Under this scheme the 
oil companies had been compensated for irrecoverable state taxes to facilitate smooth 
transition from administered pricing regime to the market determined pricing regime. 
Irrecoverable state taxes include: 
 
a) A tax levied on entry of crude oil in a local area including octroi. 
b) A tax levied on the sales turnover of an oil company marketing petroleum 
product(s) declared by law to be irrecoverable as tax. 
c) Central sales tax (CST) or purchase tax levied on inter-company sales of 
petroleum products for moving the products inter-state 
 
Under this scheme compensation was supposed to be provided for items a) and c) 
which had been levied immediately prior to the commencement of the scheme. For 
the refinery or refinery dispatch the entry tax on crude oil ranged from 2 to 4 percent 
and octroi was around 2.25 percent. For products the CST/purchase tax was 
applicable at the rate of 4 percent. The compensation under the scheme was confined 
                                                            
39   Gazette Notification ref P- 20029/18/2001-PP dated 16 January 2003. 
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to under-recoveries arising from the aforesaid irrecoverable taxes (payable on petrol, 
diesel, PDS kerosene and domestic LPG and on crude oil) at tax rates not exceeding 
the rates given above. The scheme came into effect from 1 April, 2002 and was 
applicable for the financial year 2002-03 only. 
 
4. ATF Sales Tax Compensation Scheme40: This scheme was applicable from 1 April, 
2002 to 22 November, 2002. Under this scheme, oil companies had been 
compensated in lieu of the sales tax under-recoveries on account of ATF sales to 
foreign airlines. 
 
Despite the mounting burden of subsidy on the Government and the rising under-recovery of 
the public sector oil companies the government decided to extend the subsidy on domestic 
LPG and kerosene till 2010 starting from March 2007 for the larger interest of the consumers 
and agreed to retain the subsidy of Rs. 22.80 per domestic LPG cylinder and Re. 0.83 per 
litre of kerosene till March 2010.41  
 
Box 1.3 below contains the recommendation of various committees that have been formed 
from time to time to deliberate on pricing and subsidy on kerosene and domestic LPG in the 
post APM era. Appendices  1.12 and 1.13 goes into a detailed analysis of the trend and 
pattern of PDS Kerosene and LPG consumption and the extent of diversion in order to gauge 
how much of the subsidy under PDS Kerosene and Domestic LPG Subsidy Scheme is 
actually getting utilized for the intended purpose.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
40   Gazette Notification ref. P-20029/18/2001-PP dated 31 March 2003. 
41   K.K. Shankar, ‘Govt. extends kerosene, LPG subsidy till 2010’, The Indian Express, October 12, 2007. 
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 Box 1.3 
Recommendation of Various Government Committees on Pricing of and Subsidy on LPG and 
Kerosene in the post APM era 
 
 
In view of the overwhelming evidence that the policy of giving kerosene at subsidized prices under the 
PDS to all consumers regardless of their economic status is resulting in waste, leakage, adulteration and 
inefficiency the Rangarajan Committee (GoI, 2006) recommended restricting subsidized kerosene to 
BPL families. The report further stated that ‘in computing the quantum of subsidy entitlement of states on 
PDS kerosene, it is appropriate to use the estimates of BPL households of the Planning Commission as it 
will imply uniform criteria and estimation methodology across states’. The subsidy entitlement as 
calculated could be passed on to the states at an aggregate level ‘allowing the states flexibility to fine-tune 
their own subsidy schemes’. The report, however, underscored that ‘the only fool proof mechanism for 
preventing leakages and diversion is to move towards a system of a single price at the point of retail sale 
for all consumers with the subsidy being passed on to BPL consumers through alternate mechanisms like 
cash transfers to eligible beneficiaries through coupons or bank transfers or delivery of subsidy through 
smart debit cards.’  
The report considered the subsidy regime in domestic LPG as ‘most egregious and distortionary of all the 
subsidies in the oil sector’. In view of the fact that BPL households constitute just a meager proportion 
(considered as 10 percent in the report) of the total domestic LPG consumers, the report strongly objected 
to providing such huge subsidy of an order of nearly 11,000 crores (as of 2005-06) to non-poor segment of 
the society. Hence, it recommended a one-time upward adjustment in the price of domestic LPG by 
Rs.75/cylinder. This, as the report calculated, would reduce the annual burden of subsidy by nearly 
Rs.4,500 crores. The report further underscored on the necessity to gradually increase the price of 
domestic LPG so that the retail price adjusts completely to the market level eliminating the subsidy 
altogether. 
                    …………….continued 
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Box 1.3 continued…….. 
 
Prior to this the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Petroleum and Natural Gas in its Sixth and 
Tenth Report (GoI, 2005 and GoI, 2006a1), while reiterating the need to continue the subsidy on PDS 
kerosene and domestic LPG, recommended for an improved delivery mechanism, targeted at real 
beneficiaries, leaving no room for misappropriation or misuse. The Committee held the view that the net of 
subsidy sharing was required to be widened by including all the refineries (both public and private sectors) in 
the country, considering the gains made by them within the existing system of pricing. The committee had 
also expressed its desire that a part of the oil development cess that had been collected on crude oil might 
also be utilised to provide subsidy on kerosene and LPG. 
The Report of the Working Group on Petroleum and Natural Gas for the Eleventh Plan (GoI, 2006c) 
underscored that the domestic LPG subsidy did not serve the vast multitudes living below the poverty line but 
a burgeoning urban middle class. The report contended that the price difference between the domestic LPG 
and non-domestic LPG (bulk or packed) had been a cause of diversion of domestic LPG for non-domestic 
use, like hotels, restaurants, and automotive sector.  The subsidy on kerosene was also equally ineffective on 
account of its biggest use for the adulteration of diesel. In effect, not only had government been subsidising 
those who need it least, the major burden of this subsidy had been shouldered by the state-owned oil 
companies. In line with the recommendations of the Rangarajan Committee this report also underscored on 
complete elimination of subsidies on domestic LPG.  
The recent report submitted in September 2008 by the High Powered Committee on Financial Position of 
the Oil Companies (GoI, 2008) under the chairmanship of B.K.Chaturvedi, Member, Planning Commission, 
recommended that in urban and semi-urban areas, BPL families who need kerosene should be issued smart 
cards or receive the funds via cash transfer through the banking or postal system for purchase of present 
ration card entitlement of kerosene.  The actual sale of the product should be done at market prices and on 
unrestricted basis. Consequently, the allocations of kerosene made to states should be reduced. The 
distribution system also needs to be modernized. This scheme should be subsequently extended to rural areas 
with the exception of the tribal and remote regions of the country where the prevailing system should 
continue. 
For domestic LPG, the report recommended that the entitlement to subsidized supply should be reduced to 6 
refills in a year. In the subsequent year this should be further reduced to 4 refills and in the next two years to 
2 and nil respectively. Households should be encouraged to subscribe to the piped city gas network wherever 
available. However, LPG subsidy for BPL families should, as in the case of kerosene, be eventually provided 
directly through smart cards or cash transfer mechanism. 
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In view of the observations made by various committees, as indicated in Box 1.3, the 
Government has proposed and undertaken some remedial measures regarding the 
implementation of subsidy on LPG and Kerosene which are captured in Appendix 1.14  
 
 
1.5.2.4  Financial Repercussions of Pricing of Petroleum Products in Post-APM Era on 
Oil Companies42 
 
As has already been pointed out earlier, there has been a sharp and spiraling increase in 
international crude oil and petroleum products prices coupled with considerable volatility 
since the end of 2003, the year immediately after the dismantling of APM. The crude oil 
price of Indian basket geared up from about $23 per barrel in March 2002 to $147 per barrel 
in June 2008. Another trend which had been noticed in the international market is that the 
prices of some sensitive petroleum products have been moving faster and with greater 
volatility than the prices of crude, depending on seasonal and regional demands for these 
products globally. The picture of international crude and petroleum product prices and the 
asymmetry in adjustment of domestic retail selling prices of sensitive petroleum products in 
the post-APM era has already been portrayed before. 
The impact of this large and continuous increase in the world price of crude oil has been 
substantive and diverse on the finances of the oil companies. The upstream (i.e. crude oil 
exploration and production) companies, namely ONGC and OIL, gained substantially out of 
this price rise as they were receiving import parity prices for the crude which did not reflect 
the true cost of production. Furthermore, as mentioned before, by considering the potential 
impact that the price increase would have on common man and economically vulnerable 
sections of the society, the government did not allow any increase in the domestic retail 
selling prices of sensitive petroleum products in concordance with the movement of 
international prices. The decision to put on hold the necessary price revision took its heavy 
toll on public sector refining-cum-oil marketing companies namely, Indian Oil Corporation 
                                                            
42  This section draws heavily on the Report of the High Powered Committee on Financial Position of Oil 
Companies (GoI, 2008). 
57 
 
(IOC), Hindustan Petroleum Corporation (HPCL), Bharat Petroleum Corporation (BPCL) 
and Indo-Burma Petroleum Ltd. (IBP), which suffered substantial losses to the extent that 
they failed to pass on the increase in costs to the customers due to non-revisions in retail 
selling prices. The standalone public sector refiners namely CPCL (Chennai Petroleum 
Corporation Ltd.), MRPL (Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemical Ltd), KRL (Kochi 
Refinery Ltd.) and BRPL (Bongaigaon Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd.) gained to the 
extent that they could export at international prices or charge the OMCs prices based on 
international petroleum product prices and also depending on their cost-competitiveness in 
the global context. The private sector refiners namely Reliance and Essar Oil (with ultra-
modern refineries), which are also relatively cost-competitive globally, gained largely on the 
same count. 
 
In view of the above situation and under the directions of the government, the public sector 
exploration and production (E&P) companies have passed on sizable discounts to the OMCs 
by supplying crude oil at prices that were significantly lower than the prevailing 
international price. Furthermore, the stand–alone refiners in both the public and private 
sectors also offered considerable concessions. Government has also been providing subsidies 
from the Union Budget on account of PDS kerosene and domestic LPG since 2002/03 and 
since 2005/06 they have been providing Oil Bonds to the OMCs.  
The total financial support extended by upstream companies, budgetary subsidy and oil 
bonds amounts to Rs. 28,430 crore in 2005-06, Rs. 47,708 crore in 2006-07 and Rs. 63,820 
crore in 2007-08. This was just the external financial support provided to the OMCs and 
precludes the forgone profits of the refiner-cum-OMC companies. Fig.1.6 below exhibits 
details of the external financial support provided to the OMCs since 2002-03. 
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Fig. 1.6:  External Financial Assistance Extended to Refiner-cum- OMC (in Rs. Crore) 
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 Data Source: GoI (2008) 
 
Although the rise in crude oil prices were not fully passed on to the customers in the form of 
increased retail selling prices and consequently led to stagnation and even erosion of profits 
of the oil companies, their overall turnover (sales revenue) multiplied between 2002-03 and 
2007-08. Table 1.16 below provides a snapshot of the total turnover for the entire oil 
industry. The Proft Before Tax (PBT) numbers for the OMCs and for the upstream oil 
companies have been reported in table 1.17 and include the external assistance (as shown in 
fig. 1.6). Thus, if the external financial assistance to the OMC is taken out, the aggregate 
profits of the public sector units (PSU) in the oil industry in 2005-06 and 2006-07 would 
turn out to be considerably lower than that in 2003-04 and 2004-05.  
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Table 1.16   Total Turnover of Oil Companies 
                                                                                                                                                        Rs 
crore                                                                                                                                                                               
  
Note:* Gross Turnover is from segment information for Reliance Industries, which pertains to 
petroleum refining and includes production and marketing operations    
Source: GoI (2008) 
 
Furthermore, had there been no external financial assistance, the PSU refiners and OMCs 
would have reported substantial operating losses. The cash profits or losses of the PSU 
refiners-cum-OMCs in the absence of the external financial assistance are reported 
separately in table 1.18. Cash profits/losses shown in the table have been calculated as the 
PBT plus depreciation (but after accounting for interest payment). Fig. 1.7 juxtaposes in two 
adjacent panels the ‘under-recoveries’ as reported by the OMCs and the cash losses which 
the OMCs would have incurred in absence of external assistance.  It could be observed from 
fig.1.7 that total reported under-recoveries of OMCs on four sensitive products exceeds their 
total cash losses by nearly Rs.22,000 to 23,000 crore.     
  2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
A Upstream Oil Companies 
 ONGC 34,691 32,510 46,710 48,201 56,904 60,137 
 GAIL 10,642 11,296 12,927 14,875 16,546 18,580 
 OIL 2,897 3,143 3,916 5,550 5,389 6,082 
 Sub-total of A 48,230 46,949 63,553 68,627 78,839 84,799 
B Refiners Plus OMC 
 IOC 119,884 130,203 150,729 183,172 220,779 247,479 
 BPCL 47,584 52,983 63,343 82,935 102,408 121,684 
 HPCL 54,259 57,511 65,218 76,920 96,918 121,684 
 IBP 8,947 10,650 13,51 15,666 na na 
 Sub total of B 230,674 251,347 292,804 358,693 420,105 481,262 
C Standalone Refiners  (PSU) 
 MRPL 8,059 12,612 20,693 28,243 32,208 37,339 
 CPCL 8,630 9,476 16,296 25,409 29,349 32,889 
 BRPL 2,059 3,196 4,990 6,289 6,426 6,645 
 KRL 10,616 11,716 15,440 NA NA NA 
 Sub-total of C 29,361 37,000 57,419 59,941 67,983 76,873 
D New Private Sector 
 Reliance * 34,409 41,606 51,700 71,117 85,977 101,482 
 Essar oil   1,045 637 474  
 Sub total of D 34,409 41,606 52,745 71,754 86,451 101,482 
E Grand Total 342,674 376,903 466,522 559,014 653,379 744,417 
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Table 1.17:  Profit before Tax (PBT) of Oil Companies 
                 Rs crore 
  2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
A Upstream Oil Companies 
 ONGC 16,124 13,609 19,666 21,837 23,670 25,235 
 GAIL 2,518 2,814 2,871 3,277 2,860 3,855 
 OIL 1,341 1,482 1,623 2,674 2,483 2,713 
 Sub-total of A 19,983 17,905 24,160 27,788 29,013 31,803 
B Refiners Plus  OMC 
 IOC 8,414 9,691 5,955 6,706 10.485 10,080 
 BPCL 1,994 2,636 1,356 407 2,768 2,597 
 HPCL 2,412 2,980 1,641 285 1,967 1,109 
 IBP 141 333 83 32   
 Sub-total of B 12,960 15,640 9,035 7,430 15,220 13,786 
C Standalone Refiners (PSU) 
 MRPL -653 575 1,461 623 1,089 1,733 
 CPCL 488 572 934 723 881 1,722 
 BRPL 308 440 677 267 276 449 
 KRL 697 910 1,193    
 Sub-total of C 840 2,497 4,265 1,614 2,245 3,904 
D New Private Sector 
 Reliance 2,344 3,500 5,521 5,916 7,723 10,373 
 Essar Oil   14 -92 -55  
 Sub-total of D 2,344 3,500 5,535 5,824 7,668 10,373 
E Grand Total 36,127 39,541 42,994 42,656 54,146 59,866 
Source: GoI (2008) 
 
 
Table 1.18:   Cash Profits (+) / Losses (-) of PSU refiners-cum-marketing companies  
(without external financial assistance) 
Rs crore 
 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
IOC 6,039 6,906 3,255 -6,796 -14,235 -22,075 
BPCL 1,125 1,636 223 -5,085 -6,569 -10,858 
BPCL 1,478 1,865 490 -5,122 -6,961 -12,276 
Sub-total of above 8,641 10,406 3,968 -17,003 -27,765 -45,209 
Source: GoI (2008) 
 
In order to explain this deficit it needs to be mentioned at this juncture that besides four 
sensitive items, namely petrol, diesel, PDS kerosene and domestic LPG, the PSU refiners-
cum-oil marketing companies also produce other products on which the Central Government 
did not impose any price-control. It could thus be expected that the companies had passed on 
to the consumers (mostly industrial) of these uncontrolled products the full effect of the rise 
in crude oil prices and thereby generated financial surplus. The PBT or cash profit/loss 
performance includes the financial surplus (profits) from the manufacture and sale of these 
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items. It also needs to be underscored that other than the surplus generated from freely 
priced products, actual profits and losses of the oil companies additionally take into account 
other income streams like dividend income, pipeline income, inventory changes, and 
refining margins in the case of integrated companies (GoI, 2006).  
The Report of the High Powered Committee on Financial Position of Oil Companies (GoI, 
2008) emphasised that the gap between cash losses and under-recovery (as shown in fig.1.7) 
could be partly explained by the presence of this financial surpluses generated from business 
volumes of the OMCs related to other products (having no price control) in the figure for 
cash losses.  
 
Fig. 1.7   Cash Losses and Under-recoveries by OMCs (Rs Crore) 
Cash Losses without External Financial Assistance 
 
 
 
Under-recoveries 
 
Data Source: GoI (2008) 
 
It could also be argued that due to the presence of this financial surplus the figure for cash 
profit/loss performance (as shown in table 1.18 and in the fig. 1.7) does not truly reflect the 
impact of price restraint on the finances of the oil companies. The impact would obviously 
be much larger and could be more appropriately reflected if this financial surplus generated 
from uncontrolled products could be computed and taken out but that would not be very easy 
to estimate exactly. It also needs to be mentioned at this juncture that refining of crude oil is a 
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process industry where crude oil constitutes around 90 to 95% of the total cost and the remaining 5 to 
10 % constitutes the refining cost. Since the value added is relatively small, determination of 
individual product-wise surplus becomes problematic and could not be correctly estimated. Thus, 
the cash losses as considered here could at best be considered as indicative. 
 
Another important issue that deserves special attention in this context is how the under-
recovery, as indicated in fig.1.7, is being defined and estimated by the OMCs. The notion of 
under-recovery comes directly from the import-parity pricing formula that was existing from 
April 2002 till May 2006 immediately after dismantling of APM. The only changes that took 
place in the basis of calculation from June 2006 onwards is that the price determination 
formula has been changed from import parity to trade parity for petrol and diesel in line with 
the recommendations of the Rangarajan Committee. The import parity price, as elucidated in 
earlier section on pricing of petroleum products, was yielding the retail selling prices (RSP) 
for four sensitive products namely petrol, diesel, domestic LPG and PDS kerosene. From the 
RSPs if the tax and other statutory levies are deducted, the net sales realisation (NSR) could 
be obtained. The difference between the NSR so obtained going by the notional import-
parity pricing formula and NSR as permitted by the government under price-control has been 
termed as ‘under-recovery’ per unit of the good (litre or cylinder). The method of 
computation of per unit under-recovery remains the same in case of trade parity price. If the 
per unit under-recovery is multiplied by the total quantity sold by the company during the 
year, what one arrives at is the total annual under-recovery. Fig. 1.8 below shows the 
product-wise total annual under-recovery of OMCs for four sensitive petroleum products 
namely domestic LPG, PDS kerosene, petrol and diesel from 2003-04 till April-June, 2008. 
As the under-recoveries explained above is computed on the basis of a notional formula 
(import parity / trade parity), it could not be linked either to variation in crude oil price or to 
the published annual account of the oil companies. 
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Fig. 1.8:  Product-wise Under-recovery of OMCs for sensitive products (Rs crore) 
 
Data Source: GoI (2006), PPAC 
 
 
1.5.2.5  Implication for Refining Margin  
 
In the refining of crude petroleum a variety of products arise and the refinery margins are 
usually related to cracked margins. In fact a barrel of crude on distillation gives both lighter 
and heavier fractions. The lighter components consisting of LPG, MS, ATF, kerosene, HSD, 
etc. command higher margins and are high value products with prices that are generally 
higher than that of the crude oil. The heavier components - such as furnace oil, bitumen and 
coke- commands lower margin and sell at prices lower than that of crude. Moreover a part of 
the crude oil is consumed to produce the heat needed in the refining process and this ranges 
from 6 to 8 per cent for modern refineries43, usually termed as Refinery Boiler Loss (RBL).  
Thus, in order for the refining operation to be viable, the selling prices of the higher value 
                                                            
43  Ultra-modern refineries consume more as RBL as their complexity which enables them to work with very 
difficult (very heavy and sour) crude oils also involve more processing. 
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refinery fractions, that is, the light and middle distillates must cover (a) the direct cost of 
crude; (b) the cost of the RBL; (c) the negative contribution from the lower-than–crude oil 
values that will be realized on the sale of the heavy ends and coke; (d) the operating and 
capital servicing costs of the refinery.  
 
A refinery usually tries to optimize its capacity and boost its margins by procuring heavy 
crude (with high sulphur content) available at cheaper prices to produce more remunerative 
light and middle distillates. However, Indian PSU refineries usually have higher yields of 
heavier ends, whereas the private sector with modern refineries has the capacity to maximize 
lighter ends and middle distillates. Consequently the refining margins of the private sector 
refinery are far superior to that of public sector refineries (GoI, 2005). 
 
Gross Refinery Margin (GRM) can be defined as the difference between the costs of raw 
material (majorly crude) and weighted average prices of petroleum products. Given the fact 
that GRM of the refining business depends on the weighted average prices of petroleum 
products, it is contingent upon the pricing mechanism of the petroleum products that is being 
followed by the Indian refineries. In the APM era refining margins were administered by the 
government on the basis of fixed return on capital employed (i.e. on a cost plus basis, as 
explained before) which in the post-APM era used to be decided initially on an import parity 
basis and currently on trade-parity basis for petrol and diesel. However, it ought to be 
reiterated here that in computing the notional import or trade parity prices the actual cost of 
exploration and refining within the country or factors like inter-refinery differences in 
respect of crude oil, production pattern, size, complexities of refineries etc. are not taken into 
account. Thus the derived GRM under the import parity / trade parity regime is dissociated 
from the aforesaid factors which ideally should have been reflected in GRM in order to 
distinguish between the GRM of an efficient and inefficient refinery.  
 
Furthermore, given the fact that every refinery is unique in terms of its ability to process 
various crude forms and generate products, the production levels can be different. Thus it 
becomes very difficult to determine a benchmark GRM using the weighted average 
65 
 
production of various refineries44. If a refinery could produce more high-value products or 
refine various forms of crude it could post GRMs above the benchmark GRMs. 
 
The factors that generally lead to an increase in gross refining margins are:-  
 
¾ Crude selection (proper crude mix),  
¾ Import of crude in larger parcels to improve economies of scale in respect of 
freight, landing charges etc.,  
¾ Higher spreads between crude and product prices which are further dependent on 
differential in international prices of both crude and products, duties like customs 
duty on crude and the differential between customs duty on crude and products 
and other taxes (like entry taxes) that are imposed on crude etc. 
¾ Enhanced production of value added products and  
¾ Reduction of cost  
 
Of all the above factors, the higher spread between the crude and petroleum product prices in 
the international market has contributed mostly towards increasing domestic refinery 
margins in the post-APM era especially since 2004-05.  
The product–crude spread is usually considered as the difference between a unit measure 
(barrel or KL or tonne) of crude oil (delivered at a specific location) and the wholesale 
selling price (refinery gate price) at the same location. In most international markets like 
USA (New York Harbour and Gulf Coast), North West Europe (Amsterdam-Rotterdam-
Antwerp or ARA) and Singapore the spreads for both petrol and diesel (refinery gate price) 
over crude oil acquisition cost in 2002-03 has been observed as hovering around 25 per cent. 
In 2003-04 the spread changed to over 30 per cent for petrol and little less than 25 per cent 
for diesel. Fig. 1.9 below shows the average annual spread between the refinery gate prices 
of petrol and diesel and the composite crude acquisition cost for the US45.  
                                                            
44    Usually, Singapore is considered as a benchmark, and the Singapore margin calculation considers Dubai 
crude oil as an input and assumes a product mix of approximately 32% gasoline (petrol), 19% of jet fuel 
and kerosene, 16% of diesel/gasoil, 23% fuel oil, 3% LPG and 7% bitumen/naptha.   
45  The coefficient of variation (CV) between the market prices of gasoline, HSD and kerosene reported at the 
various centres in the USA (New York Harbour and Gulf Coast), North West Europe (Amsterdam-
Rotterdam-Antwerp or ARA) and Singapore has been observed as fairly small and the trend has been 
towards smaller variation, most pronounced in the case of diesel and also in gasoline (petrol) and jet fuel.  
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Fig.1.9:   Spread between Composite Crude and Gasoline (Petrol) and Composite Crude and 
Diesel (HSD) for US New York Harbour (in per cent) 
                   
                  Data Source: PPAC 
 
As per import parity system, the pricing of the products was calculated in the country on the 
basis of the international prices of the products from April 2002 onwards. This building up 
of the import-parity prices on a notional basis, as explained before, ultimately led to 
ballooning of the prices of the products in the domestic market.  
 
In order to estimate the average product margins for Indian Refiners-cum-OMCs in the 
period immediately after dismantling of APM, the Report of the High Powered Committee 
on Financial position of oil companies (GoI, 2008) assumed a 2.5 per cent margin on trading 
sales, and a total marketing and distribution margin at the rate of 5 per cent in 2002-03 and 
2003-04. Thus the report estimated that the average product margins over the purchase cost 
of crude for these years amounted to 50 to 60 per cent for IOC, between 40 and 50 per cent 
for BPCL and about 25 to 40 per cent for HPCL. The report underscored on the possibility 
that the financial position of IOC and BPCL for these years might have derived partly from 
consideration other than efficient operations. However from 2004-05 onwards the crude oil 
                                                                                                                                                                        
In other words, there is a considerable degree of co-movement in the market prices reported at these 
centres. (GoI, 2008).  
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prices rose steeply and the corresponding increase in the retail selling prices were also 
restrained by the government. As a result, the margins of these three companies fell sharply 
to 20 per cent and below, in 2006-07 and continued to decline further in 2007-08. 
 
 
1.5.2.6 Taxes and Duties on Petroleum Products in the post-APM era: An Examination  
 
 
In the earlier section 1.5.2.2 on ‘Major Changes in Prices of Petroleum Products in the post-
APM era’ the variation in petroleum products on account of changes in taxes and duties have 
already been captured. This section however takes up the issue in greater details isolating the 
tax component in the retail pricing of petroleum products more clearly.  In fact a major 
reason for the under-recovery of the OMCs, as already explained before is the high taxes and 
duties on petroleum products.  
 
Central Taxes: Excise and Customs Duty 
 
Since 1 April 2002, the central government has reduced customs and excise duties on the 
four sensitive products four times. From March 2005 onwards, customs and excise duties on 
kerosene and LPG have been reduced to zero. For petrol and diesel excise duties had been 
reduced from 30% and 14% respectively to 8 per cent plus Rs. 13/litre and to 8per cent and 
Rs. 3.25/litre while custom duties were reduced from 20 per cent to 10 per cent for both 
products. From March 2007 onwards the ad valorem component of excise duties on both 
petrol and diesel has been reduced from 8% to 6% and the custom duties on both products 
were reduced from 10 per cent to 7.5 per cent. In addition to customs and excise duties, 
education cess@2 per cent on aggregate duties was levied with effect from 9 July 2004 and 
an additional 1 per cent was also levied with effect from 1 March 2007.  
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Table 1.19 
Major Changes in Excise/Customs Duty on Four Sensitive Products  
(Post-Dismantling of APM) 
 
Excise Duty  
Item As on 
1.3.02 
As on 
1.3.03 
As on 
16.6.04 
As on 
19.8.04 
As on 
01.03.05 
As on 
01.03.07 
As on 
04.06.08 
Petrol 32%+ 
Rs 7 
per 
litre  
30%+ 
Rs 7.50 
per litre 
26%+ 
Rs 7.50 
per litre 
23%+ 
Rs 7.50 
per litre 
8%+ 
Rs 13.00 
per litre 
6%+ 
Rs 13.00 per 
litre 
6%+ 
Rs 13.00 
per litre 
Diesel 16%+ 
Re  1 
per 
litre 
14%+ 
Re  1.50  
per litre 
11%+ 
Re  1.50 
per litre 
8%+ 
Re  1.50 
per litre 
8%+ 
Re  3.25 
per litre 
6%+Re  
3.25per litre 
6%+ 
Rs 3.25per 
litre 
Kerosene 
(PDS) 
16% 16% 16% 12% NIL NIL NIL 
Domestic 
LPG 
16% 16% 8% 8% NIL NIL NIL 
Customs  Duty 
Item As on 
2.6.98 
As on 
28.2.99 
As on  
1.3.2000
As on 
30.9.2000
As on 
1.3.03
As on 
19.8.04
As on 
1.03.05 
As on 
01.03.08 
As on 
04.06.08
Petrol 32% 30% 25% 20% 20% 15% 10% 7.5% 2.5% 
Diesel 32% 30% 25% 20% 20% 15% 10% 7.5% 2.5% 
Kerosene 
(PDS) 
Nil Nil Nil Nil 10% 5% NIL NIL NIL 
Domestic 
LPG 
12% 10% 10% 
 
10% 10% 5% NIL NIL NIL 
 
Note: 1) With effect from 9.7.2004, an additional levy of Education Cess @ 2% has been imposed and with 
effect from 1.3.2007 an additional 1 % has also been imposed. 
    2) The excise duties provided here are for branded diesel and petrol  
 
Data Source: PPAC 
 
State Taxes 
Due to India’s federal structure, the state governments are authorized to levy certain taxes 
and surcharges on petroleum products. These mostly include, among others, Value Added 
Tax (VAT) and/or sales tax, entry tax, transit charges and other levies. The charges consist 
of flat rates and ad valorem taxes and sometimes a combination of both. The number of 
levies and their magnitude vary widely among states. The tables in Appendix 1.15 provide 
the detailed information on recoverable and irrecoverable sales taxes and duties on four 
sensitive products namely petrol/motor spirit (MS), diesel (HSD), domestic LPG and PDS 
kerosene across all states as of October 2008.  
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Fig 1.10 portrays the comparative picture of state-wise recoverable sales taxes on petrol and 
diesel. The state of Maharashtra has a 26% VAT on diesel while the state of Punjab imposes 
only 9% VAT. However, Punjab’s VAT on petrol is 29% as compared to Maharashtra’s 
28%. Also, within the states local government units and municipalities can levy extra 
charges on petroleum products. For instance, in Thane and Navi Mumbai area, the rate of 
VAT for petrol (MS) and diesel (HSD) is 26% and additional surcharge of Re.1/ litre on MS 
and thus the effective VAT rate for petrol is 28% for petrol while that for diesel is 26%. 
Gujarat, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Punjab, Chandigarh, Rajasthan and West Bengal 
imposed cess in addition to VAT on petrol and diesel with cess only on petrol for J&K. 
Beyond recoverable taxes there are irrecoverable taxes like Central Sales Tax (CST) for all 
states and UTs (except Chandigarh, Himachal Pradesh, J&K, Rajasthan and Uttarakhand), 
entry tax (Bihar, Gujarat, Maharashtra-Mumbai, Uttar Pradesh) octroi (imposed by 
Municipality Corporation of Mumbai), additional irrecoverable surcharge on VAT (Bihar) 
additional tax on sales tax (West Bengal) additional purchase tax (Tamilnadu, Andhra 
Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Assam). For some states the rate of irrecoverable taxes are 
abnormally high like entry tax on Mumbai (on petrol), Bihar (on petrol, diesel, domestic 
kerosene and LPG) purchase tax on Tamilnadu (for petrol and diesel), Karnataka (for petrol), 
additional surcharge on VAT in Bihar on diesel and additional tax on sales tax for West 
Bengal on petrol and diesel. The central government has been requesting the states very 
often to follow its example to reduce taxes and other charges on petroleum products. 
However for most of the time these requests were not granted. The most important reason 
for why the states have not reduced the taxes and duties lies in the fact that taxes and duties 
on petroleum products and crude oil constitute major revenues for the central and state 
governments. This issue has been taken up in the subsequent section. 
70 
 
 
Fig 1.10: Effective Recoverable Sales Tax Rates on Petrol and Diesel in Various States  
(as of June, 2008) 
 
Note:   1. Rates are inclusive of cess, additional tax and VAT concession but precludes entry tax and other 
irrecoverable taxes.  
2. In case of Punjab VAT rate was 27.5% and 8.8% on petrol and diesel respectively on the taxable 
turnover before the price hike by the central government on 4 June 2008 and VAT rate would be 
13.75% and 4% on petrol and diesel respectively on the increased taxable turnover as a result of 
price hike.  
 
Source: PPAC 
 
 
1.5.2.7  Contribution of Petroleum Sector to State and Central Exchequer 
 
The petroleum industry contributes a substantial amount both to the Central and State 
exchequer in terms of duties, taxes, royalty, dividends etc. The total contribution has risen 
from Rs 96,751 crore during 2002-03 to Rs 1,63,970 crore during 2007-08. Levy-wise 
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details of contribution to the exchequer by the petroleum sector from 2001-02 onwards till 
2007-08 is given in fig.1.11. 
Of the total contribution by the petroleum sector to the government exchequer, the 
contribution of excise duty and sales tax are substantial (see fig.1.11). The customs duty is 
ad valorem in nature while excise duty on petrol and diesel is a combination of ad valorem 
and specific rates. For the entire period from 2002-03 to 2007-08 in the post-APM era the 
contribution of excise duties out of the total contribution by the oil sector remained between 
33 to 40%. The contribution of customs duty ranged between 7 to 10 %. The situations in the 
states are similar. As state taxes are predominantly ad valorem in nature the absolute 
revenues from the petroleum sector for the states have increased substantially over the last 
few years. The contribution of sales tax revenue remained consistently between 30 to 35 % 
of the total contribution of the petroleum sector to the exchequer. 
 
Fig. 1.11:  Contribution to State and Central Exchequer by the Petroleum Sector (in Rs Crore)  
      
         Data Source: PPAC   
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Fig. 1.12 
Percentage Share of Petroleum Sector in the Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Receipts of the 
Exchequer 
                    
Data Source: PPAC for customs, excise and sales tax figures of the petroleum sector; RBI for 
data on state taxes and Union Receipts Budget 2007-08 for central taxes  
 
Fig. 1.12 shows the percentage share of petroleum sector in the individual duties and taxes of 
the central and state exchequer from 2001-02 to 2007-08. The share of customs revenue 
collected from the petroleum sector for the period 2002-03 to 2007-08 remained between 12 
to 20 % of the total receipt of the Centre on account of Customs Duties. The share of excise 
duties for the same period remained between 33 to 40 %. The proportion of sales tax 
collected from petroleum sector remained between 31 to 37% of the total sales tax collected 
by the states. 
The picture depicted above points towards a very high dependence of the central and state 
governments on revenues from the petroleum sector. Furthermore, the central government 
also receives revenues from the petroleum sector in form of royalties, corporate tax, 
dividends and others and the state governments obtain additional revenues from royalties, 
corporate tax, dividends and the state specific levies as well as a share of the excise duty 
collected by the centre.  
What is really intriguing is that the central government revenues from total taxation of 
petroleum products and crude oil is substantially above the total support in the form of fiscal 
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subsidies and oil bonds extended to the refiners-cum-oil marketing companies in the 
petroleum sector (see fig.1.13  below). 
 
Fig. 1.13. Total Tax Revenue Collected from the Petroleum Sector versus Total Oil Bonds plus 
Fiscal Subsidies Extended to the Petroleum Sector (in Rs. Crore) 
                  
      Data Source: PPAC 
 
In particular, the ad valorem taxes and levies had the paradox effect of benefiting the 
government from increasing international oil prices. However, in view of India’s social and 
economic status such an inelastic revenue source has always been considered as crucial by 
the government in financing its policy objectives.  
 
1.5.2.8  Absolute and Relative Tax Burden on Retail Prices of Petrol and Diesel 
 
The existing incidence of taxation (as of September 2008) as a percentage of the retail price 
at Delhi remains significant for petrol and diesel as shown in the figures 1.14 and 1.15 
below:  
 
74 
 
 
Fig. 1.14: Petrol Prices at Delhi: Share of Duties and Taxes  
 
Source: PPAC 
 
Fig. 1.15: Diesel Prices at Delhi: Share of Duties and Taxes  
 
Source: PPAC 
 
 
Tax levels as a percentage of the retail price in India (Delhi as benchmark) for petrol and 
diesel as indicated in the figures above are quite similar to the levels prevailing in the 
developed OECD countries (as shown inside parenthesis in the figures 1.16 and 1.17 below) 
that have been considered here with the exception of USA. Leaving aside USA, the share of 
tax in retail selling price of petrol varies from 26 % for Canada to 61% for Germany. For 
diesel the proportion of tax ranges from 20% for Canada to 48% for UK. It could also be 
observed from figures 1.16 and 1.17 that the retail selling price of automotive diesel is not 
much lower than gasoline (petrol) in most of the developed world, even though in most of 
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these countries taxes on diesel are significantly lower than that of gasoline (petrol). USA 
turns out to be an exception where, in general, taxes on automotive fuels are much lower in 
comparison to other OECD countries and, in particular, the tax on gasoline (petrol) is lower 
as compared to that on diesel unlike other OECD countries (as of September 2008). As a 
result the retail selling price of automotive diesel in the USA is higher than that of gasoline 
(as indicated in figures 1.16 and 1.17).  
 
 
Fig. 1.16: Comparison of Retail Selling Price and Ex-Tax Price of Petrol with Developed 
Countries  
(as of September 2008) 
 
                      
 
 
Note:  1. Figures in the parenthesis indicates percentage of taxes in the total retail selling price  
2. World prices have been converted from local currencies (euros, pounds, yen and cents) and 
local  volume units (litres, gallons) to Rupees per litre using the average exchange rate for 
September which is $/Rs =48.07 . 
Prices reported for India are at Delhi as of September, 2008 
 
Data Source: PPAC 
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Fig. 1.17: Comparison of Retail Selling Price and Ex-Tax Price of Diesel with Developed 
Countries  
(as of September, 2008) 
                    
Note:  1.  Figures in the parenthesis indicates percentage of taxes in the total retail selling price  
2. World prices have been converted from local currencies (euros, pounds, yen and cents) and 
local  volume units (litres, gallons) to Rupees per litre using the average exchange rate for 
September which is $/Rs =48.07 . 
Prices reported for India are at Delhi as of September, 2008 
Data Source: PPAC 
 
Retail selling prices of petrol (gasoline) in France, Germany and Italy and Spain were 15 to 
30 per cent higher than that of diesel as of September 2008 while taxes were higher by 85 to 
95 per cent. In the UK and Japan, petrol (gasoline) retail prices were 6 to 9 per cent higher. 
Taxes were about 33 per cent higher on gasoline in the UK and about 57 per cent higher in 
Japan.   
 
In the USA, diesel prices in June 2007 were only 9 per cent less than gasoline, which 
changed to diesel being more expensive in December 2007 and May 2008 by a factor of 10 
and 15 per cent respectively.  US taxes on diesel were lower than that on gasoline by about 
15 per cent in all the three periods (GoI, 2008). 
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In the figures 1.16 and 1.17 the comparable prices and taxes are also reported for India (for 
Delhi) which show that the relative tax burden on diesel is much lower than that in any other 
OECD country, even though the absolute burden on motor spirit in India is actually lower 
than that in every other country shown above with the exception of Canada and USA. 
Moreover, both the absolute price of diesel and its relative price vis-à-vis gasoline in India is 
much lower than that of the developed nations listed above. 
 
Considering historically, the pricing mechanism in India usually had a built-in cross subsidy 
burden on petrol which was used to keep the price of diesel artificially depressed.  This was 
later substituted by imposing a much higher excise duty on petrol. The consistent implicit 
assumption behind introducing asymmetry in the retail selling prices of petrol and diesel has 
been that petrol is the fuel of the relatively better off. However, this price asymmetry has had 
the unintended consequences of creating an incentive for motorists to opt for diesel rather 
than for gasoline cars.  As a result the number of diesel run cars on the road has increased 
substantially and diesel has gradually become dominant in the Indian automotive fuel basket.  
The report of the Working Group on Petroleum and Natural Gas for the Eleventh Plan (GoI, 
2006b) however, countered the implicit assumption behind introducing this asymmetry and 
underscored that 71 percent of non-transport vehicles are two wheelers, which run on petrol. 
The country has the highest population of two wheelers and is also growing at a much faster 
rate as compared to cars. The report further underscores that these two wheelers essentially 
provide mobility to the aspiring class, the climbers and the middle class and not to the 
relatively affluent sections. Thus, the report emphasises that the basic rationale for 
introducing the price differential does not seem to hold sufficient ground. 
 
Considered from the perspective of relative merits and demerits, the production of diesel 
requires more capital investment in plant and equipment at the refinery end, but also 
provides more work energy and therefore where appropriate engines are available, more 
mileage kilometres per litre than a similar petrol driven car. The technical and operating 
factor that favours gasoline is the faster acceleration and easier operations especially in cold 
weather, but from the use value side there is little logic in selling diesel to motorists at prices 
that are lower than gasoline.   
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The only consideration, for maintaining ‘a significant price discrimination in favour of diesel 
is that it creates positive externalities in the case of public transport and the trucking industry 
that carry people and goods, creating an extensive transport network, across the length and 
the breadth of the country’ (GoI, 2008). 
 
However, this logic does not apply for passenger cars and sports utility vehicles.  Nor, does 
it apply for substantial consumption of diesel by industrial units and generators.  Hence the 
issue of the extent to which the diesel prices should be maintained below that of gasoline, 
and the amount of burden it places on government finance and upstream oil companies needs 
much more careful consideration from the utility side other than the cost or the opportunity 
cost side. 
 
Domestic consumption of refined petroleum products at the aggregate level has been 
growing at an average annual rate of about 2.5 per cent between 2000-01 and 2005-06.  The 
pace of expansion picked up in 2006-07 to about 6.7 per cent and provisional estimates 
suggest that in 2007-08 it geared up further to 7.0 per cent (see fig 1.18).  The acceleration as 
shown in fig. 1.18 could clearly be attributed to higher growth of consumption of both petrol 
and diesel in the past two years.  Consumption of diesel rose by 6.7 per cent and 11.1 per 
cent in 2006/07 and 2007/08 respectively. Even in case of petrol, where the retail selling 
price was not that much depressed as compared to diesel, consumption rose by as much as 
11.2 per cent in 2007/08. 
 
It also deserves special emphasis that during this period of accelerating petroleum product 
consumption, the overall pace of expansion of the economy as measured by the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) was around 9 per cent per annum.  Thus it is very difficult to 
negate that the rising economic growth coupled with the policy of keeping the retail selling 
prices of petrol and diesel lower through administrative restraints on domestic retail selling 
prices led to increase in consumption of petrol and diesel at such an aggressive pace.  A 
higher selling price of automotive fuel could perhaps have kept aggregate growth in 
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automotive fuel consumption within levels that were lower than the general pace of 
economic expansion by placing higher incentives on fuel efficiency. 
 
 
Fig 1.18 Annual Growth in Consumption of Petrol, Diesel and Other Refined Products 
(Percentage Growth over Previous Year) 
 
Source: Basic Petroleum Statistics, available at www.petroleum.nic.in 
 
It ought to be underscored that price is the most effective economic instrument for energy 
conservation. This is particularly true when the consumers on grounds of vulnerability are 
being completely shielded from unprecedented hike in world crude prices and that of 
imported crude, that provide more than 75 per cent of the refinery throughput for meeting 
domestic consumption of finished products.  Rather the domestic consumers have been 
constantly subsidised by way of subvention from the general government revenue ( fiscal 
subsidy) and expansion of government debt (oil bonds with debt implication), both of which 
have significant and critical alternative use – whether it is in the creation of social or of 
physical infrastructure. This measure also frustrated the primary objective of dismantling of 
APM for creating a vibrant and competitive petroleum sector and brought the entire 
dismantling process into grief. 
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Appendix 1.1: Major End Use of Petroleum Products 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Product Major End Use 
    
LPG 
Domestic fuel. Also for industrial application where 
technically essential. Now permitted as auto fuel. 
NAPHTHA/NGL Feedstock/ fuel for fertiliser units, 
  feedstock for petrochemical sector and 
  fuel for power plants. 
MS(Petrol) Fuel for passenger cars, taxies, 
  two & three wheelers. 
ATF Fuel for aircrafts. 
SKO (Kerosene) Fuel for cooking & lighting. 
HSD  Fuel for transport sector (railways/road), 
  agriculture (tractors, pumpsets, threshers,etc.) 
  and captive power generation. 
LDO Fuel for agricultural pumpsets , 
  small industrial units, start up fuel for power 
  generation. 
FO/LSHS Secondary fuel for thermal power plants, fuel/ 
  feedstock for fertiliser plants, industrial units. 
BITUMEN Surfacing of roads. 
LUBES Lubrication for automotive and industrial 
  applications. 
OTHER PRODUCTS Feedstock for value added products. 
(BENZENE, TOLUENE, 
MTO,LABFS,CBFS, 
PARAFFIN WAX,ETC.) 
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APPENDIX 1.2  
 
BUILD-UP OF PRICES UNDER APM 
 IMPORTED  
CRUDE OIL 
POOLED FOB PRICE OF  
CRUDE OIL 
INDIGENOUS  
CRUDE OIL 
+ 
FREIGHT 
+ 
OCEAN LOSS 
+ 
INSURANCE 
+ 
WHARFAGE 
+ 
AUXILIARY DUTY 
= 
DELIVERED COST OF CRUDE
+  
REFINING COST (Chemicals, catalysts & utilities, consumables, salaries and  
wages, repairs & maintenance/overheads, depreciation, etc.,) 
+ 
RETURN ON CAPITAL EMPLOYED 
=
RETENTION PRICE PER TONNE OF CRUDE THRUPUT  
 X 
STANDARD THRUPUT 
divided by 
STANDARD PRODUCTION  X  INDICES OF EACH PRODUCT 
X 
INDEX OF EACH PRODUCT 
=
RETENTION PRICE PER TONNE OF PRODUCT
WEIGHTED AVERAGE RETENTION PRICE FOR EACH PRODUCT ON  
INDUSTRY BASIS + Rs. 25 
=
 
BUILD-UP OF EX-REFINERY PRICES
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EX-REFINERY PRICE 
+ 
CUSTOMS/ EXCISE DUTY 
+ 
MARKETING MARGIN 
+ 
SURCHARGES 
+ 
PRODUCT PRICE ADJUSTMENT 
=
EX-STORAGE POINT PRICE AT 
REFINERY POINT
+ 
RPO CHARGES/SURCHARGES FOR MS/HSD 
=
EX-RETAIL OUTLET PRICE WITHIN FREE DELIVERY ZONE 
(excluding freight and local levies)
 
 
 
Source: ‘Pricing of Petroleum Products in the wake of Economic Liberalisation’, Report of 
CAG on the Union Government (Commercial), 19 of 1995. 
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Appendix 1.3 
Major Sector-wise Recommendations of the ‘R’ Group 
 
 
Exploration and production 
 
¾ Increasing the competency of ONGC and OIL by empowering the Board of 
Directors to diversify into downstream, allowing them to market their own 
produce, provide level playing fields to all companies in bidding blocks and 
providing international price for domestic crude produced by them 
¾ Enhancement of domestic production through reserve accretion in India and 
abroad 
¾ Acquisition and absorption of new technology for reserve accretion 
¾ Mobilisation of venture capital required for building national oil industry 
¾ Simplifying procedures in awarding production sharing contracts, provision of 
fiscal incentives and rationalisation of tariff structure 
¾ Assignment of regulatory and monetary functions to Directorate General of 
Hydrocarbons (DGH) which shall be an autonomous body 
 
Refining and Marketing 
 
¾ Providing total freedom to refineries to decide their product mix to optimize their 
profitability through better yields and value added products 
¾ Decanalisation of petroleum products  
¾ Continuation of administered pricing for mass consumption products till the 
national economy is ready to accept market-determined prices. 
¾ Doing away with cross-subsidisation of products and providing all subsidies 
through budgetary allocations in a transparent manner 
¾ Phased deregulation of marketing by giving freedom to oil companies to appoint 
dealers/distributors by withdrawal of Sales Plan Entitlement (SPE) mechanism 
and thereafter full decontrol 
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Tariff and Pricing Reforms 
 
¾ Phased rationalization of tariff structure by bringing down customs duties to a 
range of 0-5 per cent and providing a maximum tariff protection of 25 percent on 
finished products. 
¾ Phased rationalization of royalty and cess on crude to modest levels (as prevalent 
internationally) and calculation of the same on ad-valorem basis instead of 
specific values. 
¾ DGH and OCC should be designated as the regulatory authority for the upstream 
and downstream sector respectively. 
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Appendix 1.4 : Phased Programme of Reforms 
 
Particulars 
 
Model 
Transition Phase 4 Years 
Year 1 (1998-99)  
i) Removal of cost plus formula and 
payment to crude producers as 
percentage weighted average 
FOB price of actual imports 
75 percent 
ii) Products to be controlled during 
transition period  
MS(Motor Spirit i.e. Petrol) , HSD (High-
Speed Diesel) , Kerosene, ATF (Aviation 
Turbine Fuel) and LPG (Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas) 
iii) Withdrawal of retention margin for 
the refineries and refinery gate 
prices for controlled products 
Adjusted import parity prices to existing 
refineries and tariff-adjusted import parity 
prices to new refiners 
iv) Products to be de-controlled Naphtha, FO (Fuel Oil), LSHS , Bitumen, 
Paraffin wax 
v) Exim ( Export-Import) Policy Decanalisation of imports/exports of all 
petroleum products except crude (slop 
crude and crude condensate), NGL 
(Natural Gas Liquids), ATF, petrol, diesel. 
vi) Sourcing of crude Sourcing of crude to be liberalised and 
import to be allowed for joint and private 
sector refineries under actual user license. 
vii) Customs Duties Rationalisation to be done in a phased 
manner 
viii) Increase in prices of: 
Kerosene(PDS) 
LPG (Domestic) 
 
30 percent of existing ex-storage point 
price 
33 percent of subsidy passed on  
ix) Freight and other under-recoveries 33 percent to be passed on in an equated 
manner 
x) Shipping of crude oil Withdrawal of cost plus formula for 
shipping of crude oil and move towards 
market related rates 
Year 2 (1999-2000)  
i) Payment to crude producers as 
percentage of weighted average 
of FOB 
77.5 per cent 
 
ii) Increase in prices of: 
 
Kerosene (PDS) 
 
LPG (Domestic) 
 
 
30 per cent of revised ex-storage point 
price at the end of year 1 
A further 33 per cent of subsidy to be 
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 passed on  
 
Particulars 
 
 
Model 
 
iii) Freight and other under-recoveries A further 33 percent to be passed on in an 
equated manner 
iv) Rationalisation of duties To continue  
Year 3 (2000-01) 
 
 
i) Payment to crude producers as 
percentage weighted average 
FOB price 
80 per cent 
ii) ATF Deregulation of imports and pricing 
iii) Increase in prices of: 
Kerosene (PDS) 
 
LPG (Domestic) 
 
20 per cent of the revised ex-storage point 
price at the beginning of the year 
Suitable adjustment of price to reach 
subsidy level at 15 per cent of import 
parity.  
iv) Freight and other under-recoveries Balanced subsidy to be passed on, in an 
equated manner. 
Year 4 (2001-02) 
 
 
i) Payment to crude producers as 
percentage weighted average 
FOB price 
82.5 per cent 
ii) Increase in prices of: 
Kerosene (PDS) 
Suitable adjustment in prices to reach a 
subsidy level at 33.33 per cent of the 
import parity. 
2002 onwards Full Deregulation. 
 
Transfer of subsidy on kerosene (PDS), 
LPG (Domestic) and freight subsidy on 
supplies to far flung areas to the fiscal 
budget of the Government. 
 
Source: MoPNG Resolution NO.P-20012/29/97-PP dated 21 November 1997 (appeared 
in The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part-1-Section1, New Delhi, Monday, 24 
November 1997) 
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Appendix 1.5  
Revisions in the rate of Royalty on Crude since 1990 
 
Year Royalty 
1.1.1990 to 31.3.1993 Rs 481/ MT 
1.4.94 to 31.3.1996 Rs 539.20 / MT 
1.4.1996 to 31.3.1998 Rs 595/MT 
1.4.1998 to 31.3.2002 @20 percent of the well head price 
From 1.4.2002 onwards @20 percent of the well head price for onshore 
and shallow water offshore (upto 400 meters) 
and @10 percent of well head price for offshore 
above 400 meters for heavier crude of API 25 
degrees and less  
Source: GoI (2005) 
 
Appendix 1.6  
 
Revisions in the Customs Duty on Crude 
 
Year Customs Duty 
Until end-March, 1994 Specific 
1994 to June 1 1998 35 percent (ad valorem) 
June 2 1998 to 27 January 1999 22 percent (ad valorem) 
28 January 1999 to February 2000 20 percent (ad valorem) 
1 March 2000 to 29 September 2000 15 percent (ad valorem) 
30 September 2000 to February 2005 10 percent (ad valorem) 
1March 2005 to 3 June 2008 5 percent (ad valorem) 
From 4 June 2008 Nil 
Source: Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell (PPAC), MoPNG, and GoI (2005) 
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Appendix 1.7  
Elements of Cost in Price Build up of Public Sector Oil Companies for Petrol and 
Diesel  
(as of November 2006) 
S.No. Particulars Petrol Diesel 
   (Rs per KL) (Rs per KL) 
1 Import Parity Freight  322.75 406.73 
2 Under-recovery towards 
delivery charges 
40 40 
3 Terminalling charges 50 50 
4 Marketing Cost 425.43 425.43 
5 Escalation in marketing cost 
per annum (in percent) 
5 5 
6 Marketing margin  390.79 400.05 
7 Stock loss 171.95 35.69 
8 Return on working capital Equivalent to 20 
day’s cost of 
sales excluding 
depreciation 
@interest rate of 
11 percent 
Equivalent to 20 
day’s cost of 
sales excluding 
depreciation 
@interest rate of 
11 percent 
9 Retail pump outlet(RPO) 
charges (only cost) 
150 150 
10 DLAF 100 100 
11 RPO surcharge 36 21 
Source: GoI (2006c) 
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Appendix 1.8  
Methodology of calculating the cost price of PDS Kerosene on import parity basis 
S.No. Cost Component Unit Basis of Computation 
1. FOB Value $/barrel Average of mean of high and low quotes of Platts Asia 
Pacific Arab Gulf (APAG) and Petroleum Argus Asia 
Pacific Products Report for Arab Gulf market during the 
“pricing period”.  
2. Premium/Discount $/barrel Monthly average of spot premium/discounts for the same 
period as FOB as published in Argus/Platts for Jet fuel or 
Kerosene 
3. Ocean Freight 
(Converted by 
using conversion 
factor 7.90 bbl per 
MT) 
$/barrel World Scale freight rates from Bahrain (Sitra) to the 
designated Indian ports adjusted by AFRA (Average Freight 
Rate Assessment) for MR (Medium Range) vessel size. The 
designated ports for Kerosene are Jamnagar, Hazira, 
Mumbai, Mangalore, Kochi, Chennai, Visakh, Haldia and 
Kandla46.  
4. C&F Price $/KL Total of 1 to 3 above (Converted to KL using conversion 
factor of 6.2898 bbl per KL) 
5. Insurance $/KL Actual applicable tariff rates set by GIC 
6. CIF Price $/KL Total of 4 and 5 above 
7. Exchange Rate Rs/$ Monthly average (for the same period as FOB) of the 
available RBI reference rates during the pricing period 
8. CIF Price Rs/KL Converted to Indian rupees 
9. Customs Duty Rs/KL As applicable. Assessable value for calculation of customs 
duty would include the CIF price and landing charges at 1% 
in line with the customs rules. 
10. Ocean Loss Rs/KL As permitted under the APM 
11. Wharfage, Port 
Charges, Landing 
Charges, Bank 
Charges etc. 
Rs/KL Dues applicable for the port based on the official tariff rates 
of the respective ports or nearest government port, in case of 
a private port, whichever is lower. Bank charges at the 
prevailing rates as assessed by SBI. 
12. Landed Cost 
(Import Parity 
Rs/KL Total of 8 to 11 above 
                                                            
46  Kandla would be considered as a designated port in case there are actual imports of PDS Kerosene at 
this point.  
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Price) or Refinery 
Transfer Price 
13. Storage/distribution 
cost and return on 
investments 
Rs/KL Weighted average of updated costs/return of the companies 
under the APM regime not exceeding Rs. 250/KL for cost 
and Rs 130/ KL for return. Port terminalling charges would 
be compensated to the extent of terminals located at the 
designated ports only at the rate mentioned in the agreement 
for ‘Sharing of Infrastructure and Safekeeping Arrangement’ 
dated 31March 2002 or updated APM rates for the year 
2001-02 whichever is lower. 
Compensation for private facilities at Visakh 
14. Inland Freight Rs/KL Cost of inland transportation from the nearest designated 
port or the next nearest designated port if the capacity of the 
nearest port is exhausted by the cheapest available mode i.e. 
pipeline, rail or road from the designated port 
For the Northeast, inland freight would be calculated from 
the nearest Northeast refinery/production source instead of 
designated port for the quantities available from the 
Northeast refineries/production source. 
For far flung areas inland freight shall be calculated up to the 
Tap-off point or railhead only. 
15. Depot cost before 
stock loss and 
working capital 
Rs/KL Total of 12 to 14 above. 
16. Stock loss Rs/KL 0.28 percent of depot cost excluding depreciation, return on 
investment and excise duty. 
17. Cost of working 
capital 
Rs/KL Interest on working capital for 18 days stock holding at SBI 
prime lending rate(PLR) per annum on item 15 above, 
excluding depreciation and return on investment but 
inclusive of excise duty 
18. Cost price at 
depot 
Rs/KL Total of 15 to 17 above. 
Source: Adopted from Gazette Notification Ref. P-20029/18/2001-PP dated 28 January 
2003, Annexure I. 
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Appendix 1.9  
Methodology of calculating the cost price of Domestic LPG on import parity 
basis 
S.No. Cost Component Unit Basis of Computation 
1 FOB Value $/MT Saudi Contract price as quoted in Platts LP Gaswire for 
the previous month. LPG price is considered as a 
weighted average of butane and propane prices with 
weightage 60% and 40% respectively.  
2. Premium/Discount $/MT Monthly average for the same period as FOB as quoted in 
LP Gaswire 
3. Ocean Freight  $/MT Fully built up freight from Ras Tanura to the designated 
Indian ports calculated on the basis of Charter Hire rates 
obtained from Clarkson Shipping Intelligence Weekly for 
13 TMT vessel size except Mangalore for which 18 TMT 
vessel size shall be considered. The designated ports for 
LPG are Ratnagiri, Kandla, Jamnagar, Hazira, Mumbai, 
Mangalore, Kochi, Chennai, Visakh and Haldia subject to 
the following proviso: 
a) In case the designated port does not have 
imported LPG handling facility, then the capacity 
of LPG production facility at the designated port 
shall be treated as the capacity of the designated 
port 
b) In case the designated port has handling facilities 
for import as well as LPG production facility, 
then the capacity of the designated port would be 
summation of LPG handling capacity at the port 
and the capacity of LPG production facility. 
In case of actual imports the difference between the 
transportation cost of imports per Transchart and notional 
freight limited to the quantities imported would be 
considered. For the purpose of subsidy, the addition to 
ocean freight would be limited to quantities imported in 
the pricing period. 
4. C&F Price $/MT Total of 1 to 3 above  
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5. Insurance $/MT Actual applicable tariff rates set by GIC 
6. CIF Price $/MT Total of 4 and 5 above 
7. Exchange Rate Rs/$ Monthly average (for the same period as FOB) of the 
available RBI reference rates during the pricing period 
8. CIF Price Rs/MT Converted to Indian rupees 
9. Customs Duty Rs/MT As applicable. Assessable value for calculation of 
customs duty would include the CIF price and landing 
charges at 1% in line with the customs rules. 
10. Ocean Loss Rs/MT As permitted under the APM 
11. Wharfage, Port 
Charges, Landing 
Charges, Bank 
Charges etc. 
Rs/MT Dues applicable for the port based on the official tariff 
rates of the respective ports or nearest government port, in 
case of a private port, whichever is lower. Bank charges at 
the prevailing rates as assessed by SBI. 
12. Landed Cost 
(Refinery Transfer 
Price) 
Rs/MT Total of 8 to 11 above 
13. Storage/distribution 
cost and return on 
investments 
Rs/KL Weighted average of updated costs/return of the 
companies under the APM regime not exceeding Rs. 
391/MT towards cost and Rs 239/MT for return. Port 
terminalling charges would be compensated to the extent 
of terminals located at the designated ports only at the rate 
mentioned in the agreement for ‘Sharing of Infrastructure 
and Safekeeping Arrangement’ dated 31March 2002 or 
updated APM rates for the year 2001-02 whichever is 
lower. 
14. Bottling Charges Rs/MT Updated costs plus return under APM not exceeding Rs 
1449/MT.  
15. Charges for Cylinder 
Cost 
Rs/MT Cylinder depreciation spreading the cost of cylinders over 
12 years, plus interest on net borrowings (after adjusting 
customer deposits) at SBI prime lending rate per annum. 
This cost shall not exceed Rs 1275/MT. 
16. Inland Freight Rs/KL Cost of inland transportation from the nearest designated 
port or the next nearest designated port if the capacity of 
the nearest port is exhausted by the cheapest available 
mode i.e. pipeline, rail or road from the designated port. 
95 
 
For Jamnagar-Loni LPG pipeline actual tariff paid would 
be used for computation of inland freight. 
For the Northeast, inland freight would be calculated from 
the nearest Northeast refinery/production source instead 
of designated port for the quantities available from the 
Northeast refineries/production source. 
For far flung areas inland freight shall be calculated up to 
the Tap off point or railhead only. 
17. Bottling plant cost 
before stock loss and 
working capital 
Rs/MT Total of 12 to 16 above 
18. Stock loss Rs/MT 0.25 percent of item 17 excluding depreciation, return on 
investment and excise duty. 
19. Cost of working 
capital 
Rs/MT Interest on working capital for 18 days stock holding at 
SBI prime lending rate(PLR) per annum on item 17 
above, excluding depreciation and return on investment 
but inclusive of excise duty 
20. Cost price at depot Rs/MT Total of 17 to 19 above. 
Source: Adopted from Gazette Notification Ref. P-20029/18/2001-PP dated 28 January 2003, 
Annexure II. 
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Source: PPAC  
Appendix 1.10  
Major Revisions in Retail Selling Price at Delhi  
(between 1 April 2002 to December 2003) 
 
MS PDS Kerosene HSD LPG 
  (Rs./litre) (Rs./litre) (Rs./litre) (Rs./Cylinder) 
04.06.02 28.94  17.99  
16.06.02 29.18  18.23  
16.08.02 29.00  18.05  
01.09.02 29.20  18.34  
16.09.02 29.66  18.68  
01.10.02 29.91  18.91  
17.10.02 30.24  19.23  
01.11.02 30.26  19.25 241.20
16.11.02 29.57  18.57  
01.12.02 28.91  18.06  
03.01.03 29.93  19.07  
16.1.03 30.33  19.47  
1.02.03 30.71  19.84  
1.03.03 32.10  21.21  
16.03.03 33.49  22.12  
16.04.03 32.49  21.12  
27.04.03 31.49  20.12  
01.05.03 31.50  20.13  
16.05.03 30.40  19.18  
01.06.03 30.30  19.08  
26.06.03   9.01    
01.09.03 32.40  20.33  
01.10.03       241.60
16.10.03 31.70  19.73  
16.12.03 32.70  20.73  
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Appendix 1.11  
Major Revisions in Retail Selling Price at Delhi (January 2004 to June 2008) 
 
 Date MS 
PDS 
Kerosene HSD LPG 
  (Rs./litre) (Rs./litre) (Rs./litre) (Rs./Cylinder) 
01.01.04 33.70   21.73   
16.06.04 35.71   22.74 261.60
01.08.04 36.81   24.16   
5.11.04 39.00   26.28 281.60
16.11.04 37.84       
01.04.05 (VAT 
Implemented at Delhi) 37.99 9.05 28.22 294.75
04.05.05 (VAT rate on 
diesel reduced to 
12.50%)     26.45   
21.06.05 40.49   28.45   
25.07.05   9.08     
07.09.05 43.49   30.45   
25.05.06   9.09     
06.06.06 47.51   32.47   
21.06.06 (Reduction in 
VAT Rate) 46.85   32.25   
30.11.06 44.85   31.25   
16.02.07 42.85   30.25   
06.06.07 43.52   30.48   
27.09.07   9.15     
8.02.08 (Pollution cess 
implemented on HSD) 30.76
15.02.08 45.52   31.76   
05.06.08 (includes 
interim revision in 
dealer’s margin) 50.56   34.80
346.30 (304.70## 
effective 
09.06.08)
                        ## after considering Delhi State Government subsidy of Rs.40 /Cylinder 
         Source: PPAC 
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Appendix 1.12 
Analysis of the Pattern of Subsidized Kerosene and LPG Consumption in India47 
 
According to the Census of India (2001) estimates, 33.6 million households use LPG for cooking purposes out 
of which 25.75 million belong to urban areas and 7.85 million belong to rural areas. Furthermore about 48.0 
per cent of urban households and 5.7 per cent of rural households use LPG. However, the number of LPG 
connections has gone up steeply since 2001.  As per the figure recorded on March 1, 2001 there were about 
57.85 million connections (including double cylinder and more than one connection at a given residential 
address).  As on March 1, 2008 the total number of domestic LPG connections stands at 100.98 million which 
indicates a phenomenal rise of about 75 per cent.  
 
Table 1.12.1 below adopted from the more recent National Family Health Survey II (conducted by 
International Institute of Population Sciences under the aegis of Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, 
Government of India) conducted in 2005 also corroborates the above observations and shows that only 5% of 
rural India uses LPG as cooking fuel. The table further shows that over 74% of the Indian population still uses 
firewood, dung cakes, coal, etc. as domestic fuel. 
Table 1.12.1 : Main Type of Fuel Used for Cooking in India 
 
Type of fuel Urban Households Rural Households All India 
Wood 23.1 73.1 59.3 
Crop residues 0.5 8.1 6.0 
Dung Cakes 1.4 8.4 6.5 
Coal/Coke/Lignite/Charcoal 4.9 1.7 2.6 
Kerosene 21.5 2.7 7.9 
Electricity 0.8 0.2 0.4 
LPG 46.9 5.1 16.7 
Biogas 0.6 0.5 0.5 
Others 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Total Percent 100 100 100 
Source: National Family Health Survey-II  (www.nfhsindia.org) 
 
The National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) also undertakes annual Household Consumer Expenditure 
Survey which provides detailed information on state-wise consumption of kerosene and LPG. Table 4.12.2 
below based on data from this household consumption expenditure survey pertaining to various rounds shows 
                                                            
47    This section draws heavily on the  Report of the High Powered Committee on Financial Position of Oil 
companies which had been submitted on September 2008 for consideration of the Government (GoI, 2008). 
The High Powered Committee was constituted by the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh with Shri B .K. 
Chaturvedi.  Member, Planning Commission, as the Chairman. 
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the percentage of households in the rural and urban areas across all India using kerosene for lighting and 
cooking, and LPG for cooking purposes from 1999-00 till 2005-06.  
 
Table 1.12.2: Percentage of Households using LPG and Kerosene as Primary Source of Energy 
                                                         
                        Rural Urban 
Firewood LPG Kerosene Firewood LPG Kerosene 
  Cooking 
1990/00 75.5 5.4 2.7 22.3 44.2 21.7 
2000/01 75.4 7.2 2.4 21.0 47.4 19.4 
2001/02 73.4 8.1 2.0 23.3 49.9 15.3 
2002/03 74.3 8.5 1.6 21.2 51.2 14.8 
2003/04 74.9 9.1 1.9 20.0 55.4 13.0 
2004/05 75.7 9.0 0.9 21.5 56.4 10.4 
2005/06 74.0 9.3 1.0 20.9 57.1 9.2 
Lighting 
1999/00   50.6   10.3 
2000/01   47.8   9.0 
2001/02   47.2   7.8 
2002/03   47.4   8.3 
2003/04   46.6   8.3 
2004/05   45.6   7.0 
2005/06   42.0   7.2 
Source: GoI (2008) based on 50th to 62nd Round of NSS  
 
From table 1.12.2 it could be clearly seen that: 
 
a. Rural households are still dependent on firewood as a principal fuel for cooking and the dependence 
has reduced only marginally over the years from 75.5 per cent in 1999-00 to 74 percent in 2005-06. 
b. Rural households use kerosene primarily for lighting.  However, the percentage of rural households 
using kerosene for both lighting and cooking purposes has been steadily declining since 1999-00. The 
rural use of kerosene for lighting came down to 42 per cent in 2005-06 from 51 per cent in 1999-00.  
The proportion of rural households who use kerosene for cooking has always been marginal and has 
dropped down further to 1 per cent in 2005-06 from nearly 3 per cent in 1999-00. 
c. Urban households have been using kerosene more for cooking than for lighting purposes.  However, 
the kerosene use across urban households shows a declining trend. The proportion of urban 
households who have been using kerosene for cooking came down to 9 per cent in 2005-06 from 
nearly 22 per cent in 1999-00.  The proportion of urban households who have been using kerosene for 
lighting purpose also declined by about 30 per cent. 
 
The steady decline in kerosene use for lighting purposes in rural households across all India over the 
aforementioned period could possibly be attributed to rise in electrification of rural homes. On the other hand, 
the sharp decline in use of kerosene for cooking in urban homes is owing to a sharp rise in number of LPG 
connections provided to urban homes over the period. 
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Table 1.12.3 below indicates the proportion of households using LPG and kerosene for cooking or lighting 
across high and low income states (classified in terms of per capita NSDP) in 2005-06 and reflects upon the 
disparity at the state level in trend and pattern of kerosene and LPG use. 
 
In high income states like Punjab, Haryana and in the Union Territories (considered together), use of kerosene 
for the purpose of lighting both in rural and urban areas use has been observed to be insignificant as compared 
to low income states.  On the contrary, usage of kerosene for cooking purpose has been found to be relatively 
higher in both the rural and urban areas of high income states with urban areas being a relatively larger user of 
kerosene for cooking as compared to rural areas.   
It may also be observed that while higher LPG usage tends to be associated with higher income states, urban 
areas tend to be predominant users of LPG for cooking.  
 
Table 1.12.3 
State-wise Percentage Distribution Households using LPG and Kerosene for 2005-06 
                                                                                                                
 LPG (Cooking) Kerosene (Cooking) Kerosene (Lighting) 
States Rural  Urban Rural  Urban Rural  Urban 
High Income States 
Punjab 28.7 74.7 1.8 10.8 0.5 1.0 
Haryana 22.2 67.3 0.2 9.6 5.5 5.4 
Union Territories 20.8 52.9 22.5 11.5 8.3 0.0 
Andhra Pradesh 11.0 61.4 0.5 8.4 15.6 2.7 
Karnataka 7.0 47.5 1.8 16.7 17.3 4.2 
Kerala 18.7 41.7 0.6 0.5 13.8 6.8 
Low Income States 
Assam 11.6 70.2 0.6 9.7 64.8 7.3 
Bihar 2.0 41.3 0.1 7.2 83.8 27.7 
Madhya Pradesh 2.8 66.2 0.3 3.3 32.9 4.1 
Orissa 2.8 41.8 0.0 7.9 63.9 13.3 
Uttar Pradesh 6.7 56.2 0.0 2.2 69.6 16.1 
All India 93 57.1 1.0 9.2 42.0 72 
 Source: GoI (2008) based on 62nd Round of NSS   
 
Another interesting observation that could be made from table 1.12.3 is that states with lower urban LPG usage 
cannot be associated on a one to one basis with higher usage of kerosene as cooking fuel. In other words 
kerosene does not turn out to be a substitute for LPG as an urban cooking fuel. This observation also implies a 
continued dependence of urban poor on biomass for cooking as reinforced by a marginal reduction of just 1.4 
percent in the usage of firewood for cooking in the urban areas over the period 1999-00 to 2005-06 (see table 
1.12.2).  
 
Table 1.12.4 below juxtaposes the extent of rural electrification and kerosene allocation under PDS for the 
Indian states sorted by their per capita NSDP (as an indicator of economic profile).  The table clearly reveals 
that in several states which have already achieved 100 per cent electrification of villages there are still a large 
continuing allocations of kerosene and cumulatively such allocations amount to nearly 43 per cent of the total 
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PDS allocation for the country.  An insignificant 10 per cent of the total PDS kerosene allocated goes to states 
where the proportion of villages electrified has been 50 per cent or lower. 
 
On disaggregating the kerosene allocations between rural and urban distribution centres (as shown in table 
1.12.5) the revelation in table 24 gets reinforced all the more as it turns out that the states with cent percent 
rural electrification receives nearly 32 per cent of the total rural allocation and simultaneously lift 74 per cent of 
the total allocation to urban outlets. The aforesaid findings thus clearly go counter to the common perception 
that the states with lesser extent of rural electrification must be concomitantly receiving higher allocations or 
especially higher rural allocations of PDS kerosene and vice versa. 
 
Table 1.12.4:  Kerosene (PDS) Allocation State-wise sorted by Economic Profile for 2007-08 
State NSDP per capita Electrified Villages Kerosene Allocation  
Rs. per cent thousand metric tonnes 
Goa 70,112 100.0 19.2 
Haryana 38,832 100.0 145.6 
Maharashtra 37,081 100.0 1,276.9 
Punjab 34,929 100.0 237.2 
A & N Islands 34,853 NA 6.8 
Gujarat 34,157 100 743.8 
Himachal Pradesh 33,805 99.4 50.5 
Kerala 30,668 100.0 216.3 
Tamil Nadu 29,958 100.0 570.6 
Karnataka 27,291 98.1 461.9 
Sikkim 26,412 90.6 5.6 
Andhra Pradesh 26,211 100.0 517.9 
West Bengal 25,223 83.6 754.0 
Tripura 24,706 95.7 30.8 
Uttaranchal 24,585 83.7 89.8 
Arunachal Pradesh 23,788 64.0 9.3 
Mizoram# 22,417 99.0 6.2 
Meghalaya 23,420 55.0 20.7 
Nagaland# 20,821 100.0 13.3 
Manipur 20,326 93.6 19.9 
Chattisgarh 20,151 94.0 146.9 
Jharkhand 19,066 26.0 211.2 
Assam 18,598 77.3 263.0 
Jammu & Kashmir# 17,752 97.3 76.4 
Rajasthan 17,863 98.4 401.2 
Orissa 17,299 80.2 315.0 
Madhya Pradesh 15,647 97.4 488.6 
Uttar Pradesh 13,262 58.7 1,241.8 
Bihar 7,875 50.0 663.0 
All India 25,716 80.8 9,203.0 
#NSDP: J & K and Nagaland for 2003/04 and Mizoram for 2004/05 
Source: Adopted from GoI (2008) and based on Economic Survey 2007-08 and PPAC 
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Table 1.12.5:   Pattern of Kerosene (PDS) Allocation State-wise vis-à-vis Rural Electrification 2007-08 
 
Proportion of Villages 
Electrified 
Share of Total 
Kerosene Allocation 
Share of Total Urban 
Kerosene Allocation 
Share of Total Rural 
Kerosene Allocation 
100 per cent villages 
electrified 
43% 74% 32% 
90 per cent & above but less 
than 100 per cent  
18% 13% 20% 
80 per cent & above, but 
below 90 per cent 
13% 12% 13% 
Above 50 per cent but 
below 80 per cent 
17% 0% 22% 
50 per cent and below 10% 0% 13% 
Source: Adopted from GoI (2008) 
 
This startling observation becomes all the more significant in the light of the fact that the total allocation of 
kerosene has remained virtually unchanged at 9.2 million tonnes in 2007-08 (see the last row and last col. of 
table 1.12.4) as compared to 9.6 million tonnes in 2002-03, immediately after dismantling of APM (data 
source: PPAC), while the above evidence clearly indicates a decline in the pattern of household usage of 
kerosene.   
 
Furthermore, it also needs to be underscored that in states where rural electrification has made greater headway 
the allocation came down only marginally. In fact for those states which have achieved cent percent village 
electrification the kerosene allocation in 2007-08 was just 7 percent lower than in 2002-03, as compared to the 
reduction of 4 percent in the all-India level of kerosene allocation (GoI, 2008).  
In fine, these observations indicate - 
• There has been little or no alteration in allocated quota of kerosene by the government despite a 
substantial reduction in household usage of kerosene in the states with higher level of rural electrification 
• There has been an increased leeway for large-scale diversion of kerosene, (which has been discussed in 
details in Appendix 1.13)  
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Appendix 1.13 
Diversion on Domestic LPG and Kerosene: Brief Review of Studies 
 
The ‘PDS Kerosene and Domestic LPG Subsidy Scheme’ is universally applicable to all categories of 
consumers of these products. The subsidized kerosene is distributed through the public distribution system 
(PDS) and LPG is sold by distributors working with state-owned oil companies (as indicated before). About 
95% of the LPG market belonged to the subsidized supplies by the state owned oil companies. The subsidy is 
available to all users of the domestic LPG, irrespective of their economic status. Domestic LPG thus carries 
non-merit subsidy and is not perceived as a fuel for the poor. The kerosene subsidy, however, comes with a 
quantity constraint i.e., households are allotted quotas that vary across the states and sectors they live in and 
whether they have an LPG connection or not. For LPG, there is no such quantity constraint (GoI, 2006). 
 
UNDP and ESMAP conducted a joint study in 2003 (UNDP/ESMAP, 2003) with the primary objective of 
facilitating access to clean fuels, in view of the significant health and social benefits of switching away from 
traditional biomass. This study found that the price subsidy on kerosene and LPG had been ineffective in 
expanding the uptake of these fuels as primary household fuels among the poor, and also found the subsidy as 
fiscally unsustainable. The study was in favour of complete phase-out of the price subsidies on kerosene and 
LPG and fostering a vibrant, open and competitive market for these fuels, given the social objectives. 
 
Another study by Gangopadhyay et al. (2004) observed that neither the kerosene nor the LPG subsidy reached 
the intended poor beneficiaries. The study relied upon NSSO data on consumption expenditure surveys for 
1993/94 and 1999/2000.  The LPG subsidy had been used largely by the higher expenditure groups in the urban 
sector and was unlikely to have much effect on biomass use. Kerosene on the other hand had been widely used 
but the subsidy on the fuel was badly targeted. The study further observed that about 50 per cent of PDS 
kerosene supplied never reached the targeted households. The study noted that on a per capita basis, the urban 
sector received a much larger subsidy. Moreover, the rural subsidy was not that progressive as higher 
expenditure groups received more subsidized kerosene than lower income groups. The study inferred that the 
kerosene subsidy turned out to be highly expensive as nearly half of the subsidized kerosene supplies got 
diverted and never reached consumers. 
 
A study completed in June 2005 by the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP) titled 
“Modeling Economic Impact of Oil Price Changes on Indian Economy-Methods and Applications” (NIPFP, 
2005) indicated the fuel usage pattern in rural and urban India for cooking and lighting purposes, wherein an 
overwhelming proportion of rural households used biomass as their primary fuel for cooking. On the other 
hand, in urban areas the percentage of households using LPG and kerosene for cooking was much higher than 
the rural households. Kerosene was observed as having been pre-dominantly used for lighting purposes in rural 
areas whereas this figure had been observed as very low in urban areas.  
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The aforesaid studies thus revealed two critical aspects:  
 
• First, the subsidies for kerosene and LPG for cooking purpose, which can be termed as modern fossil 
fuels, predominately accrued to the urban sector. 
• Second, despite subsidizing for decades, the fuel consumption pattern did not shift away from biomass 
to these modern fuels in rural areas. 
 
Furthermore, PDS kerosene, being heavily subsidized, also geared up the illegal practice to divert the fuel for 
adulteration with diesel, which had always been priced at a much higher rate. In view of this, the MoPNG 
commissioned a study to National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) to examine the kerosene 
distribution system across states, assess the demand for PDS kerosene and determine future trends. The study 
titled “Comprehensive Study to Assess the Genuine Demand and Requirement of Kerosene” submitted in 
October 2005 by NCAER (NCAER, 2005) estimated that more than 38 per cent of kerosene meant for 
distribution through public distribution system got diverted to the market. It was sold to households without 
ration cards (2.1 per cent) as well as to others for non-households usage (18.1 per cent). This prevented the fuel 
from reaching the targeted population. Classifying the states in terms of the magnitude of leakage the study 
observed that more than 50 per cent of the PDS sale in Bihar, Chandigarh, Delhi, Jharkhand, Orissa and Punjab 
got diverted. Very high leakage (about 40-50 per cent of sale of PDS kerosene) had been observed in Assam, 
Chhattisgarh, Tamil Nadu and Uttaranchal. High leakage (20-40 per cent) was observed in Andhra Pradesh, 
Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Meghalaya, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. Less 
than 20 per cent diversion was observed in Goa, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala and West Bengal. The study 
estimated that the kerosene usage penetration in the country is about 94.4, 68.9 and 86.9 per cent respectively 
for rural, urban and all areas. Per capita consumption of kerosene using households had been estimated by the 
study as 55 litres per year. In view of the above situation, the study suggested that the kerosene distribution 
should follow a method similar to that of PDS grains. All households possessing APL (above poverty line) 
cards should purchase kerosene at the market price (at economic cost to the government) and subsidised PDS 
kerosene should be made available to people with BPL, Annapurna, Antyodaya or such cards which indicates 
low income status of households. The study opined that taking out the APL card holders from the purview of 
subsidies and controlling the leakages would bring down the subsidy bill substantially.  
 
Two more studies were commissioned by Petrofed (Petroleum Federation of India) to IIM Ahmedabad on LPG 
and Kerosene distribution and related subsidy administration. The first study titled ‘LPG Distribution and 
Related Subsidy Administration-Generation and Assessment Options for Improvement of the System’ was 
completed in December 2004 and the second study titled ‘Kerosene Distribution and Related Subsidy 
Administration and Generation and Assessment Options for Improvement of the System’ was completed in 
July 2006. 
105 
 
The first report on LPG distribution and administration of subsidy contended that the best option to curtail LPG 
subsidy would be to eliminate it straight away but the report also warned that high input (crude) prices coupled 
with lack of preparatory groundwork might lead to political mobilisation against such a process. The second 
best option as identified by the study was to provide direct subsidy to BPL families through coupon which 
would allow these families to pay cash equal to retail price less the subsidy per coupon. The amount paid and a 
coupon would entitle each family to a 14.2 Kg. LPG cylinder. However, the study underscored that targeting 
LPG subsidy to BPL families might either lead to improper identification of beneficiaries (Type I error) or non-
BPL consumers taking connections (Type II error) or BPL consumers opting for multiple connections and 
hence should be monitored closely by the oil marketing companies in cooperation with district and local 
administration. The study further pointed out that irrespective of the method adopted for subsidy reduction 
there is an urgent need to examine the taxes built in the estimated gross subsidy and consider net subsidy as the 
basis of elimination. In view of the volatility of input (crude) costs on retail selling prices, the study also 
recognised the necessity of oversight or regulation by a regulatory authority to review the input costs 
periodically and allow changes. Other than moving towards direct subsidy in the form of coupons the study 
emphasized on the simultaneous pursuance of rationalization of prices and tax reforms in the petroleum sector 
in order to minimize distortions that lead to misuse, diversion, and revenue loss along with added 
environmental and governance problems.      
The second study carried out by IIMA  examined the current design of the public distribution system and price 
based subsidisation of kerosene to bring out the problems that are inherent in such mechanism and argued that 
they should be replaced by market based mechanism. In view of the well-documented failure of TPDS 
(Targeted Public Distribution System) in capturing the Type I and Type II error in selection of beneficiaries, as 
indicated in the preceding paragraph, the study recommended adoption of a direct subsidy scheme which relies 
on free market pricing of kerosene and would be largely different from the current method of uniform low 
pricing. The study suggested that the subsidy could be disbursed to the poor through smart cards and the 
accounting of disbursal should be such that the disbursement is recorded at the point of transaction and gets 
immediately captured in a large centralized database, thereby creating a permanent audit trail, akin to operation 
of credit cards. The proposed system would almost completely eliminate the indirect losses arising from 
distorted choices since the price of kerosene would be market determined and therefore not relatively cheap as 
compared to alternate fuels. As an intended outcome, the purchasing power put to the hands of beneficiaries 
would allow them to use it for spending on their choice of commodities and services and thereby not only 
enhance the use of subsidy to the full but would also add substantially to the welfare of these poor households. 
This, as the study opines, should also make direct subsidies politically rewarding. The study underscored that 
the gain to the economy and society at large from elimination of indirect losses that would otherwise arise due 
to sub-optimal choices of fuel-mix, product-mix, and asset mix would be immense as they would be completely 
eliminated in the new system. 
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In view of the fact that LPG and kerosene subsidies are ineffective in serving the desired objectives, the 
Ministry of Finance in their report of December 2004 titled “Central Government Subsidies in India” 
recommended for the removal of LPG subsidy in a gradual manner; or at least a substantial reduction in the 
subsidy element. However for kerosene they suggested the adoption of a more cautious approach in the 
reduction of subsidies since about a half of the rural households use kerosene primarily to light their homes. 
The reports did not consider cash transfer to the poor as a suitable alternate strategy for inducing a shift toward 
hydrocarbons for use as cooking fuels. The reports expressed concern that the enhanced income from modest 
cash transfer might induce the urban poor and all rural households to use more fuel wood rather than spending 
the additional income for the purpose for which it is intended. Accordingly, both the reports suggested that an 
alternate approach could be channelization of all sales of kerosene through the retail markets, and encouraging 
small distributors of fuels and issuance of coupons only to poor ration card holders with entitlement to purchase 
kerosene from a retailer at the subsidized price. This would also discourage direct diversion of subsidized 
kerosene to other sectors. 
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Appendix 1.14 
Recent Remedial Measures Undertaken or Proposed by the Government and their 
Success or Failure 
 
A. Kerosene 
Regarding Kerosene the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas has been reviewing steps taken to curb 
adulteration from time to time. In the process, several technological and institutional measures have been taken 
to contain adulteration. Some of the recent steps taken by the Ministry in the post-APM era could be 
summarized as below48: 
 1. Automation of Retail Outlets: In order to monitor the activities at retail outlets by adopting the latest 
technological improvements, MoPNG has directed the oil marketing companies towards complete automation 
of retail outlets selling more than 200 KL per month. The automation process is still ongoing. 
2. Third Party Certification of Retail Outlets: OMCs have been directed to gear up third party inspection 
and certification of all the retail outlets selling more than 100 KL per month to ensure the quality of fuel 
supplied by these outlets and prevent adulteration.  
3. Monitoring of Movement of Tank Trucks through Global Positioning System (GPS)49: In order to 
prevent adulteration during transportation, OMCs have been directed to install GPS for complete monitoring of 
the movement of all the company owned or dealer owned or contractor owned tank trucks.  
4. Marker System in Kerosene: To check adulteration in auto fuels, Government directed the public sector 
OMCs to introduce marker in adulterants. OMCs have commenced introduction of marker in kerosene on all 
India basis with effect from 1 October 2006. Under the new system, marker is being put in kerosene in all 
depots.  
                                                            
48      Based on answers provided by MoPNG to the Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 672 (available at : 
http://164.100.47.5:8080/members/Website/quest.asp?qref=121216). 
49   GPS is funded by and controlled by the U. S. Department of Defense (DOD). While there are many 
thousands of civil users of GPS world-wide, the system was designed for and is operated by the U. S. 
military. GPS provides specially coded satellite signals that can be processed in a GPS receiver, enabling 
the receiver to compute position, velocity and time. Four GPS satellite signals are used to compute 
positions in three dimensions and the time offset in the receiver clock.(source: 
http://www.colorado.edu/geography/gcraft/notes/gps/gps_f.html). 
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5. Revising the Marketing Discipline Guidelines: The Marketing Discipline Guidelines (MDG) under which 
the OMCs take penal actions against the erring dealers have been revised during August 2005 making the penal 
actions more stringent. As per stipulations in MDG a dealership would be terminated in the first instance of 
adulteration itself.  
7 Smart Card Scheme: With the objective of ensuring that the benefit of the subsidy reaches the targeted 
consumers in an efficient and cost-effective manner and to prevent any leakages, the MoPNG had proposed in 
2007 to introduce Smart Card System for distribution of PDS kerosene. The scheme was proposed on an 
experimental basis in three districts - Latur in Maharashtra, Nalanda in Bihar and Nainital in Uttaranchal in 
2007. In the Pilot project, subsidized kerosene was proposed to be made available to BPL families while all 
other ration card holders would be given non-subsidized kerosene. Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) would 
be ensuring adequate availability of PDS as well as non-subsidized kerosene during the entire period of 
implementation of the Pilot project. However, the Ministry encountered stiff resistance from the aforesaid 
states as they wanted to include above poverty line (APL) families as well, to which MoPNG was opposed, as 
it would negate the very idea of introducing the scheme. Thus the pilot project itself had to be put on hold.  
6. Jan Kerosene Pariyojna (JKP): In an effort to effectively target subsidy on PDS Kerosene, government 
launched a scheme titled Jan Kerosene Pariyojana (JKP) on October 2, 2005 in selected blocks of some states. 
Under this scheme, OMCs have created infrastructure at wholesaler locations by providing underground tanks, 
dispensing units, specially painted blue barrels and barred sheds.  Unlike the traditional system of distributing 
kerosene, delivery under JKP is made at wholesaler points by OMCs through dedicated tankers fixed with 
Global Positioning System (GPS). 
In order to assess the impact of implementing JKP on distribution of PDS Kerosene, the Petroleum Planning 
and Analysis Cell (PPAC) commissioned a study to NCAER in 2007 to undertake impact assessment of JKP.  
The impact assessment study (NCAER, 2007) found that while there has been improvement in awareness of the 
kerosene consumers about their entitlement and about the monitoring and complaint redressal mechanism 
entailed under JKP, the benefit from JKP was still lower than the cost of the scheme, without imputing savings 
from elimination of losses arising from diversion.  The study further revealed that while some states fared 
better, others failed primarily owing to a disparity in the level of involvement of Panchayati Raj Institutions 
(PRIs) in the monitoring mechanism. In fact, the level of involvement of the PRIs has been observed as having 
a positive correlation with the performance of the scheme.  The study concluded that there was considerable 
scope for rationalization of cost as well as increase in the benefits from JKP.  The proposal of regularizing the 
scheme was under consideration of the Government as of September, 2008. 
 
B. Domestic LPG 
 
Around 2005-06, there had been widespread reports of illegal LPG cylinder diversions from the subsidized 
household sector to the unsubsidized commercial sector. In order to prevent that Government instituted random 
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checks and raids. Inspectors were sent around the country to monitor the monthly sales patterns of LPG 
distributors and dealers to check if there were any unusual distortions on account of these illegal diversions. 
This action did seem to have some effect at that time. 
But, the problem has resurfaced again due to introduction of piped natural gas in Indian cities. As of September 
2008, piped natural gas supplies are restricted to three states – Maharashtra, Delhi and Gujarat. In Mumbai and 
Delhi, consumers who are now receiving piped gas have been returning their unwanted cylinders to LPG 
distributors. But the LPG distributors in many cases have been continuing to take their allocated subsidized 
LPG which they have then been reselling to the higher-paying commercial sector. The differential between 
commercial and household LPG prices is so large that the profits earned are sizeable50. This observation is all 
the more alarming in view of the fact mounting subsidies are being provided every year on a 14.2 kg LPG 
cylinder. In fact, concerns have also been raised that in absence of a specific strategy or policy for withdrawing 
the subsidised LPG cylinders from circulations, there is a high possibility that those cylinders will be diverted 
to the black market for non-domestic use. 
Earlier in 2006-07, the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas came out with an initiative to sell LPG a market 
rates to people with permanent account number (PAN) cards issued by the income tax department. However 
the initiative also had to be scrapped due to resistance. 
In order to eliminate/reduce diversion of domestic LPG to automotive sector and other commercial usage, oil 
industry initiated measures like refill audit to control the diversion. Moreover Auto LPG dispensing facilities 
have been set up in select areas to control pollution and to reduce or eliminate diversion of domestic LPG to 
automotive sector.  This measure has yielded results and Auto LPG sales have gone up substantially over 2006 
and 2007. Government had also approved a scheme for different colour coding of domestic and non-domestic 
cylinders to prevent diversion of domestic LPG cylinders.   
The Report of the Working Group on Petroleum and Natural Gas for the Eleventh Plan  recommended that in 
order to encourage use of auto LPG, Auto LPG Dispensing Stations (ALDS) should be set up on priority basis 
in big towns which are not likely to receive CNG in the short to medium term. 
As of August 2008, two measures were under consideration by the Ministry: 
• Rolling back the scheme for distribution of subsidized LPG in every area where piped gas connections 
are provided  
                                                            
50 Subsidised LPG and Black Market in India , Opinion, Poten & Partners (available at : 
www.poten.com/Opinion.aspx?id=4218 
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• Drawing up a scheme for focused and direct subsidization for LPG to consumers living in rural and 
backward areas which are not covered by piped gas networks and thereby replacing their use of 
subsidized kerosene. 
Due to these measures subsidized LPG would more likely reach targeted people, instead of unjustified supply 
to middle class and more affluent sections of society in urban areas who have been constantly enjoying the 
double subsidy benefit. The Planning Commission further suggested that any surpluses in LPG cylinders that 
may arise on account of introduction of piped natural gas could be supplied to rural areas for cooking or 
lighting purposes to replace subsidised kerosene51.   
However, the first measure may not be without problems. It is quite obvious that due to expansion of gas grids 
LPG distributors in urban areas would lose their business. Thus, concerns have also been raised that the 
government might face strong resistance which could even amount to sabotaging of the piped gas network 
itself.  
 
For improved governance and better targeting of items which includes, among others, kerosene and LPG the 
government is planning to issue a unique identification (ID) to every citizen from December 200952. In line 
with the suggestion given in the Plan document of the Eleventh Five Year Plan the subsidy amount would be 
directly credited to the individual smart card owners which could be redeemed at authorized suppliers like fair 
price shops, kerosene or domestic LPG dealers etc. According to the Plan document, the smart card would have 
a memory partitioned into distinct modules representing different entitlement groups for which implicit/explicit 
subsidies are given. These includes, among others, kerosene and domestic LPG.  
                                                            
51  Anupama Airy, ‘Double Benefit troubles piped gas’, The Financial Express, August 19, 2008. 
52  Rajeev Jayaswal, ‘ Unique Ids to deliver goods from Dec’09’, The Economic Times, November 10, 2008. 
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APPENDIX 1.15 
State-wise Recoverable and Irrecoverable Taxes as of 1.10.2008 on Petrol (MS), Diesel (HSD), 
Domestic Kerosene (SKO) and Domestic LPG 
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
1 MAHARASHTRA         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 25%+Re.1/Ltr 23.00 4.00 NIL 
  Irrecoverable Tax         
  CST 2.00 2.00 2.00 NIL 
  BMC  Octroi 2.00 2.00 0.00 2.00 
  Entry Tax 27%+Re.1/Ltr   0.00 0.00 
  Note:    1. In Mumbai, Thane and Navi Mumbai area, the rate of VAT for MS & HSD is 26 % & additional 
surcharge is Rs.1/ltr. on MS 
                   2. Cess @1% for sale within Municipality(Mun.) limits and 0.1% for sale outside Mun. limits is levied by 
Navi Mumbai  Mun. Corpn. on  MS & HSD imported into the Mun. limits of Navi Mumbai. 
                  3. Entry Tax is leviable on import of petroleum products in the State of Maharashtra. Input credit for entry 
tax is available on resale of products within Maharashtra/interstate sales 
                  4.  Exemption on inter oil company transactions is not available under VAT. However, input credit will be 
available to OMCs on subsequent sales. In case of local purchase of  products and subsequent stock 
transfer outside the state, input credit will be available to the extent of VAT in excess of 4% 
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
2 GUJARAT         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 23.00 21.00 0.00 Nil 
  Cess  2.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 
  Irrecoverable Tax         
  Entry Tax 0.00 21.60 0.00 0.00 
  CST 2.00 2.00 2.00 Nil 
  
NOTE:  1. VAT is leviable at multipoint on all products.  Exemption on inter oil company transactions is not 
available. However, input credit will be available to OMCs on subsequent sales.  
  
               2.  Entry Tax paid on stock transfers is allowed as set off against VAT payable.  
  
               3.  In case of local purchase of products within the state and subsequent transfer to other states, input credit 
will be available to the extent of VAT in excess of 4% 
  
                4. Cess is payable under the Gujarat Motor Spirit Cess Act on billing rate + VAT. Cess is exempt between 
Oil companies. 
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
3 MADHYA PRADESH         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 28.75 23.00 4.00 4.00 
  Entry Tax 1.00 1.00   6.47 
  Irrecoverable Tax         
  CST 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
  NOTE : 1. VAT on MS, HSD is at first point only. For other products VAT is multi point 
  
               2. Exemption on inter oil company transactions has been withdrawn. There is no input tax credit on MS, 
HSD & ATF. Therefore, subsequent sale of these products by oil companies will be on composite basis. 
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APPENDIX 1.15 (continued) 
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
4 CHATTISGARH         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 22.00 22.00 4.00 Nil 
  Entry Tax       1.00 
  Irrecoverable Tax         
  CST 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
  NOTE : 1.  VAT on MS, HSD is at first point only. For other products VAT is multi point.  
  
               2.  Exemption on inter oil company transactions has been withdrawn. There is no input tax credit on MS, 
HSD, SKO & LPG. Therefore, subsequent sales of these products by oil companies will be on 
composite basis 
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
5 GOA         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 20.00 19.00 4.00 Nil 
  Irrecoverable Tax         
  CST 2.00 2.00 2.00 Nil 
  NOTE :  No input credit is available on MS and HSD. 
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
6 UTTAR PRADESH         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 23.62 16.16 4.00 Nil 
  Irrecoverable Tax         
  CST 2.00 2.00 2.00 Nil 
  Entry Tax   5.00     
  
NOTE: 1. VAT on MS, HSD is at first point only. For other products VAT is multi point and input credit will be 
available to the registered dealers. 
               2. State Development Tax would no longer be applicable on any product. 
  
             3. Entry tax is leviable on entry of products into a local area from any place outside that local area including 
a place outside the state of Uttar Pradesh for consumption, use or sale therein and can be set off against 
sales tax payable. 
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
7 UTTARAKHAND         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 25.00 21.00 12.50 Nil 
  Tax Rebate (effective 14.6.08) (Re 1/Ltr) (Re 1/Ltr)     
  
NOTE: 1. VAT on MS, HSD is at first point only. For other products VAT is multi point and input credit will be  
available to the registered dealers 
  
            2. Exemption on inter oil company transactions has been withdrawn. Therefore, subsequent sale products by  
oil companies will be on composite basis 
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APPENDIX 1.15 (continued) 
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
8 DELHI         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 20.00 12.50 4.00 4.00 
  Irrecoverable Tax         
  CST 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
  
NOTE: 1. Exemption on Inter oil company transactions is not available under VAT. However, input credit will be 
available to OMCs on subsequent sales.  
  
             2. In case of local purchase of products within the state and subsequent transfer to other states, input credit 
will be available to the extent of VAT in excess of 4% 
  
             3. State Subsidy of Rs. 40/- for 14.2 kg implemented eff. 9.6.2008 
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
9 HIMACHAL PRADESH         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 25.00 14.00 0.00 4.00 
  
NOTE:  1. In case of local purchase of products within the state and subsequent transfer to other states, input credit  
will be available to the extent of VAT in excess of 4% 
  
              2. VAT on MS and HSD is at first point only. No input credit for these products will be available. 
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
10 JAMMU & KASHMIR         
  Recoverable Tax         
  Sales Tax 20.00 12.00     
  VAT     4.00 4.00 
  Cess Rs.1000/KL       
  
NOTE:  In case of local purchase of products within the state and subsequent transfer to other states, input credit 
will be available to the extent of VAT in excess of 4% 
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
11 PUNJAB         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 27.5(*) 8.8(*) 4.00 4(*) 
  Cess Re.1 /Ltr       
  Irrecoverable Tax         
  CST 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
            
  
NOTE: 1. Exemption on inter oil company transactions is not available under VAT. However, input credit will be 
available to OMCs on subsequent sales.  
  
             2.  In case of local purchase of products within the state and subsequent transfer to other states, input credit 
will be available to the extent of VAT in excess of 4% 
  
           *3. VAT rate will be 27.5%,8.8% & 4% on MS, HSD & LPG respectively on the taxable turnover before the 
price hike by the Central Govt. on 4.6.2008 and VAT rate will be 13.75%, 4.4% & 2%  on MS, HSD & 
LPG respectively on the increased taxable turnover as a result of the price hike announced by the Central 
Government on 4.6.2008. 
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  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
12 RAJASTHAN         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 28.00 18.00 4.00 Nil 
  Cess Rs.0.50/Ltr. Rs.0.50/Ltr.     
  NOTE : 1.  VAT is leviable at singlepoint at first stage on MS and HSD.  
  
              2.  Interoil company sales of MS and HSD are not exempted from VAT. For other products, input credit 
will be available. 
  
             3.  In case of local purchase of products within the state and subsequent transfer to other states, input credit 
will be available to the extent of VAT in excess of 4% 
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
13 HARYANA         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 20.00 8.8 4.00 NIL 
  Irrecoverable Tax         
  CST 2.00 2.00 2.00 NIL 
  NOTES:  1. Effective 8.7.02, tax @ 4 % is payable on interoil company sales transactions  
  
                2. In case of local purchase of products within the state and subsequent transfer to other states, input credit 
will be available to the extent of VAT in excess of 4% 
  
                2. Even tho ugh there is provision of Purchase Tax under the Haryana VAT Act, there will be no purchase 
tax liability on oil companies due to payment of VAT on inter oil company transactions price. 
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
14 CHANDIGARH         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 20.00 12.50 4.00 2.00 
  Cess Rs.10/KL Rs.10/KL     
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
15 ANDHRA PRADESH         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 33.00 22.25 4.00 4.00 
            
  Irrecoverable Tax         
  Purchase Tax 4.00 4.00     
  CST 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
  
NOTES: 1.  VAT on MS, HSD & PDS SKO is only at first point. For other products, VAT is applicable at each 
stage of sales 
  
                 2.  Purchase Tax is payable if the product is bought within the state from an Oil Company and transferred 
to other states. 
  
                 3.  Exemption on Inter oil company transactions for products other than MS & HSD is not available. 
However, input credit will be available to OMCs on subsequent sales. In case of local purchase of 
products within the state and subsequent transfer to other states, input credit will be available to the 
extent of VAT in excess of 4% 
4.  CST is irrecoverable only in the case of OMC CST sale.  It is recoverabable in  case of CST sale to 
             customers.  
  
               5.  State Subsidy of Rs. 50/- for 14.2 kg LPG cylinder implemented with effect from 6.6.2008. 
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  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
16 TAMIL NADU         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 30.00 21.43 4.00(Note 6) 4.00(Note 6) 
  Irrecoverable Tax         
  Purchase Tax 9.00 9.00     
  CST 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
  
NOTE:  1. VAT on MS, HSD is at first point of sale and no input tax credit is available on these products. Inter oil 
company transactions of these products are exempt from VAT 
  
             2. Exemption on inter oil company transactions for products other than MS and HSD above is not available. 
However, input credit will be available to OMCs on subsequent sales. 
  
             3. Purchase tax is payable if the product is bought within the state from an oil company and transferred to 
other states or consumed within the state by the purchasing oil company. 
  
             4. In case of local purchase of products (other than MS, HSD) within the state and subsequent transfer to 
other states, input credit will be available to the extent of VAT in excess of 4% 
               5. CST to Unregistered dealers is levied at 10% or regular VAT rate whichever is higher. 
  
             6. Second  & subsequent sale of LPG Domestic by distributor other than oil company and SKO under PDS 
by wholesaler/retail distributor/ fair price shops is exempt from VAT. 
  
             7. As per goods based concession notification, rate of VAT for all the products above other than MS, HSD 
are @4% effective 16.07.07 
               8. CST is irrecoverable only in the case of OMC CST sale.  It is recoverable in CST sale to customers. 
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
17 PONDICHERRY         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 12.50 12.50   1.00 
  NOTE: 1.  VAT implemented eff. 01.07.2007 
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
18 KERALA         
  Recoverable Tax         
  Sales Tax 26.03 22.49     
  
Social Security Cess @1% on 
Sales tax and addl. Tax 1.00 1.00     
  VAT     4.00 4.00 
  
Social Security Cess @1% on 
VAT     1.00   
  Irrecoverable Tax         
  Purchase Tax         
  CST Refer Note 2 Refer Note 2 Refer Note 2 Refer Note 2 
  
NOTE:  1. For products covered under VAT, exemption on inter oil company transactions is not available. 
However, input credit will be available to OMCs on subsequent sales 
  
             2. Inter State Oil Company sale of MS, HSD, SKO & LPG produced with in the state is exempt from CST 
eff ective 12.10.2006 
  
             3. Purchase Tax is payable if the product is bought within the state from an Oil Company and transferred to 
other states. 
  
             4. CST is irrecoverable only in the case of OMC CST sale.  It is recoverable in CST sale to customers. 
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  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
19 KARNATAKA         
  Recoverable Tax         
  Sales Tax 25.00 18.00     
  Entry Tax 5.00 5.00     
  VAT 4.00 1.00
  Irrecoverable Tax         
  Purchase Tax 28.00 4.00 4.00   
  CST 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 
  
NOTE:  1. MS and HSD though covered under KST Act, are exempt from Road & Infrastructure Cess.  Road & 
Infrastructure Cess is not applicable for products covered under VAT. 
 
  
              2. For products covered under VAT, exemption on inter oil company transactions is not available. 
However, input credit will be available to OMCs on subsequent sales. In  case of local purchase of 
products within the state and subsequent transfer to other states,  no input credit will be available 
  
              3. CST is irrecoverable only in the case of OMC CST sale.  It is recoverable in case of CST sale to 
customers. In case of inter state sales of LPG (Domestic) the CST rate is 1% 
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
20 ORISSA         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 18.00 18.00 4.00 4.00 
  Entry tax 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
            
  Irrecoverable Tax         
  CST 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
21 ASSAM         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 25.75%-Re.1/Ltr 15.5%-Re.1/Ltr 2.00 4.00 
  Irrecoverable Tax   
  Purchase Tax 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
  CST 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
22 BIHAR         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 24.50 18.36 12.50 1.00 
  Irrecoverable Tax         
  Surcharge on VAT   10.00     
  CST 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 
  Entry Tax 16.00 16.00 8.00 8.00 
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  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
22 JHARKAND         
  Recoverable Tax         
  VAT 20.00 14.50 4.00 4.00 
            
  Irrecoverable Tax         
  CST 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
  NOTE: 1.  Inter oil company  transaction are exempted from VAT 
      
  State/Tax MS HSD SKO LPG 
        Domestic Domestic 
24 WEST BENGAL         
  Recoverable Tax         
  Sales Tax 25.00 17.00     
  
Sales Tax Rebate (effective 
1.7.2008) (2090.00) (1360.00)     
  Cess Rs.1000/KL Rs.1000/KL 0.00   
  VAT     4.00 4.00 
            
  Irrecoverable Tax         
  Additional Tax on Sales Tax 20.00 20.00     
  CST 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
  NOTE:  1. There is a tax rebate of Rs.17/KL on MS Sales.  
Source: PPAC 
